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CIVIL RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT:
THE NEW GENERATION
LINDA

L.

HOLDEMAN*

In July 1989, Title VII was twenty-five years old. It is generally
assumed that the first twenty-five years have seen significant changes in
the economic opportunities available to America's minorities and women.
But with the rise to power of the Reagan appointees, the Supreme Court is
clearlyfashioning a new approachto issues of civil rights in employment.
This article analyzes the new Court's emerging themes and proposes a
congressionalresponse.
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INTRODUCTION

It is a new day. With civil rights activists reeling from blow after
blow to hard-won victories of Title VII's first twenty-five years, the 1988
term has ended. As the dust settles and initial reactions moderate, it
remains clear that the new majority has begun to re-fashion' civil rights
law in the employment arena.
First came City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., I narrowing, perhaps to
impossible limits, the evidentiary basis necessary to defend minority3
2
set-asides of public contracts. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio
drastically increased the difficulty of proving a disparate impact case,
and rendered some kinds of employment practices virtually immune
from disparate impact analysis.
Martin v. Wilks 4 followed, allowing subsequent collateral attacks
upon existing Title VII consent decrees, with no apparent time limitation. Martin's impact was magnified by Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 5 which held that Title VII plaintiffs may not recover their
attorneys' fees against intervenors unless the intervenors' action was
frivolous or unreasonable.
Martin was handed down with Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,6
which held that Title VII's 180 day7 limitations period for challenging
an intentionally discriminatory seniority system begins to run when the
seniority system is adopted rather than when the challenged provision is
first applied to the plaintiff. This is true despite the fact that the statute

of limitations will often expire before any employee has actually been
adversely affected or before potentially affected employees have been

notified, and in some cases there may not have been a plaintiff with
standing to bring the case during the fatal 180 days.
Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Belts 8 further restricted
challenges to seniority systems, holding that in age discrimination cases,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving actual intent to use the seniority system in order to discriminate on the basis of age in other aspects of
the employment relation.
Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union 9 held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not
1. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
2. A minority set-aside provision reserves some portion of public contracting funds
for award to minority business enterprises. See infra § II A 1(a).
3. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).

4. 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989).
5.
6.
7.
days of
agency,
8.
9.

109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires a charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180
the alleged violation. However, if a charge is filed with a state or local deferral
the limitations period for the EEOC charge is extended to 300 days.
109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989).
109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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cover any "post-contract" conduct such as discharges from employment
or racial harassment, even if such harassment is severe and pervasive
enough to interfere with continued employment. The only victory for
employment law plaintiffs came in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,' 0 which
required a disparate treatment defendant, who had acted out of both
permissible and impermissible motives, to show that it would have made
the same decision even absent the impermissible motive. Even Price
Waterhouse proved to be only a partial victory, as it decided a number of
issues in favor of employers.
A closer examination of these 1988 term cases yields telling clues to
the new majority's philosophy, and those clues do not bode well for the
economic future of minorities and women. Congress must re-visit the
areas of equal employment and affirmative action if the level of equal
employment opportunity which has been attained after twenty-five years
of struggle is to be preserved.
II.
A.

THE CASES

Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimination

The Court has never been at peace with affirmative action."I Yet,
despite the Reagan administration's avowed intention to kill it, affirmative action emerged from the 1986 and 1987 terms alive, well and perhaps even more firmly implanted as a basic principle of American
business. 12
But even in the 1987 term, a new breeze was beginning to blow
against race conscious remedial action. In Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 13 then newly appointed Justice Scalia filed a vigorous dissent,
joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice White, attacking the entire
rationale underlying affirmative action. 14 The appointment of Justice
Kennedy added a fourth vote to the anti-affirmative action camp. With
the support of the more moderate Justices Stevens and O'Connor, a
controlling conservative coalition has formed. City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co. 15 is the first result.
10. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
11. "Agreement upon a means for applying the Equal Protection Clause to an affirmative-action program has eluded this Court every time the issue has come before us." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see

generally L. MODJESKA,

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 270-303 (2d. ed. 1988) ("Term
after term, and continuing to date, the Supreme Court has striven to determine the legitimacy of racial, ethnic and sexual preferences in employment. Inevitably, the broad pronouncements of early cases were forced to yield to the impact of facts unforeseen or
insufficiently appreciated.") Id. at 270; see alsoJones, The Origins ofAffirmative Action, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 383 (1988); Jones, The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employ-

ment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70

IOWA

L.

REV.

901 (1985).

12. Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: Its All Over But the Shouting, 86
MiCH. L. REV. 524 (1987).
13. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).

14. Id. at 657.
15. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (fourteenth amendment
restrictions on race-conscious remedies)
a. Factual Background

The history of City of Richmond actually began in the mid-1970s
when Congress undertook to analyze and document the gross underrepresentation of minority-owned businesses in the nation's business
arena. A number of congressional and agency studies found that pervasive racial discrimination had seriously impaired the ability of minorities
to form and competitively operate business ventures. 16 Congressional
and agency reports specifically isolated the construction industry as one
of the areas in which an evolved business17system, though facially neutral,
operated to perpetuate past inequities.
Faced with this record, Congress enacted a minority set-aside provision as part of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 ("Act"). 19
The Act appropriated four billion dollars in federal funds for grants to
be used by state and local governments for public works projects. The
Act contained a set-aside provision which required grantees to use at
least ten percent of grant funds for contracts with minority business enterprises ("MBEs"). 20 The set-aside provision included a waiver procedure for use where MBEs were not available or where an MBE
attempted to exploit the program by overcharging for goods or
services.21
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 22 the Supreme Court held that this minority
set-aside requirement passed constitutional muster under either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny. The Court found that Congress had
abundant evidence from which to conclude that minority-owned businesses had been denied effective participation in federal public contracting, 23 that the evidence before Congress showed that the pattern of
18

16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 468, 94th Cong., at 1-2 (1975) (Report of House Committee on Small Business) (past inequities have contributed to current lack of participation;
minorities comprise 16% of population but minority businesses realize only 0.65% of
gross business receipts); H.R. REP. No. 1615, 92d Cong., at 3 (1972) (Report of the Subcommittee on Minority Small Business Enterprise ("long history of racial bias" resulting in
"major problems" for minority owned businesses)); H.R. Doc. No. 169, 92d Cong., at 1
(1971) (paucity of minority business ownership); H.R. REP. No. 1615, 92d Cong., at 3
(1972); H.R. Doc. No. 194, 92d Cong., at 1 (1972).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1791, 94th Cong., at 182 (1977) (summarizing H.R. REP. No. 840,
94th Cong., at 17 (1976)); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, QUESTIONABLE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 8(A) PROCUREMENT PROGRAM, GGD-75-57 (1975); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, MINORITIES AND WOMEN AS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 16-28, 86-88 (May 1975)
(barriers encountered by minority businesses in government contracting at federal, state
and local levels); H.R. REP. No. 468, 94th Cong. (1975) (existing efforts to increase minority participating in public contracting "totally inadequate").
18. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (1982).
20. A "minority business enterprise" was defined by the Act as "a business at least
50% of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51% of the stock of which is owned by minority group members." 42 U.S.C.

§ 6705 (0(2) (1982).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (1982).
22. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
23. "Congress had before it ...

evidence of a long history of marked disparity in the
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discrimination existed in state and local contracting as well, 24 and that
the set-aside provision was narrowly tailored to counteract that pattern
25
of discrimination.
Three years after Fullilove, the Richmond City Council undertook to
study the status of the city's public contracting business. 26 The council
reviewed the array of congressional documentation of the present effects of past discrimination in the construction industry, including state
and local public contracting. The congressional record reflected that
16-18% of the country's population was made up of minority individuals, while only 0.65% of business gross receipts were realized by minority businesses. As disturbing as these statistics were, the Richmond City
Council found that the Richmond public contracting statistics were
three times worse. Richmond's minorities numbered slightly over half
the city's population (as compared to the 18% national percentage), but
still accounted for only 0.67% of public construction spending during
27
the preceding five years.
The council also heard testimony from a number of city officials that
the local construction industry had a long exclusionary history. No witness denied local industry discrimination. The council heard testimony
that the area trade associations had virtually no minorities among their
roughly 400 members. 28 Exclusion from these skilled trade unions and
training programs prevented minorities from following the traditional
career and training path from laborer to entrepreneur.
Relying upon the uncontroverted evidence of local discrimination
in the construction industry, and the uncontroverted evidence that local
minority participation was three times worse than the national statistics
found by Congress, the Richmond City Counsel adopted the Minority
Business Utilization Plan ("Plan"), modeled closely after the federal setaside program approved in Fullilove.29 The Plan provided that at least
thirty percent of the dollar amount of each city construction contract
must be sub-contracted to MBEs. 30 The Plan was limited to a five year
life and provided for a waiver if qualified and willing MBEs were
unavailable.
Approximately six months after the Plan's enactment, the City of
Richmond invited bids on a plumbing project at the cityjail. 3 1 The cost
of the fixtures would constitute approximately seventy-five percent of
the project price. The regional manager of J.A. Croson Company
percentage of public contracts awarded to minority business enterprises" resulting from
"the existence and maintenance of barriers to competitive access which had their roots in
racial and ethnic discrimination, and which continue today, even absent any intentional
discrimination or other unlawful conduct." Id. at 478.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 480-89.
26. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
27. Id. at 714.
28. Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 739.
30. Ordinance No. 83-69-59, codified in Richmond, Va., City Code, § 12-156(a) (1985).
31. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 715 (1989).
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("Croson"), was interested in bidding on the project. Twelve days
before bids were due, Croson contacted several local MBEs that were
potential suppliers of the particular brands of fixtures required by the
project. One of the MBEs contacted was Continental Metal Hose
("Continental"). Continental was a distributor and would have to
purchase the fixtures elsewhere for resale to Croson.
Continental sought quotations for the fixtures in order to prepare
its bid, but encountered difficulties in obtaining any quotations. One of
the possible suppliers, a white-owned business, had already given a quotation directly to Croson and refused to give a quotation to Continental.
The agent of the other possible supplier refused to do business with
Continental without a credit check, which would take at least thirty days
to complete. Continental informed Croson that these difficulties were
delaying Continental's bid.
Project bids were opened on October 13 and Croson was the only
bidder. On October 19 Croson filed a request for waiver of the set-aside
provision. Prior to a decision on the request, Continental secured a
quote from another supplier and submitted a bid to Croson. However,
the bid was seven percent higher than the fixture price Croson had included in its bid for the project. That figure was presumably based on
the quote made directly to Croson by the white-owned supplier or on
bids from other white-owned businesses.
Croson persisted in the waiver request, arguing that Continental
was not an authorized supplier for the brands specified (despite the fact
that it was Croson who had solicited Continental's bid), and arguing that
Continental's bid was seven percent higher than the fixture price of
Croson's project bid. The city denied the waiver request, declined to
raise the contract price, and subsequently decided to reopen the project
for new bids.
Rather than submitting an adjusted bid reflecting Continental's participation, Croson filed suit, arguing that the Richmond set-aside plan
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. After the case had progressed through a lengthy procedural history,3 2 the
United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider
33
the constitutionality of the Plan.
b.

City of Richmond opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor found the Richmond Plan
to be constitutionally infirm. Though portions of the opinion com32. The district court upheld the Plan in all respects. See Supplemental App. toJuris.
Statement 112-232 (Supp. App.). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Croson v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985) (Croson I). The
Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit opinion and remanded in light of Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). See Croson v. City of Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016
(1986). On remand the Fourth Circuit struck down the set-aside plan as violative of the
fourteenth amendment. Croson v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Croson H). The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the 1987 Fourth Circuit opinion.
33. 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988).
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manded less than a majority, most of the opinion reflected at least a
34
broad consensus on the part of the six subscribing justices.
In what is probably its most significant holding, City of Richmond
holds that remedial racial classifications are suspect and, as such, are
subject to strict scrutiny.3 5 The degree of the majority's hostility to remedial race-conscious classifications was evident throughout the majority and concurring opinions, and was expressly reflected in the
application of the strict scrutiny standard. 3 6 In what is becoming a familiar pattern, Justice O'Connor purported to seek a conceptual middle
road between "rather stark alternatives,,"3 7 but then set out an evidentiary burden that destroyed the middle road she purported to
construct.

3 8

Under strict scrutiny, the state must identify and prove a compelling
interest which justifies the remedial racial classification, and the classification must be narrowly tailored to address that interest. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, concluded that the city's interest in remedial race-conscious action was sufficiently compelling only if it could show that such action was necessary in
order to eradicate the effects of the city's own prior discrimination, or
that the city had become a passive participant in a system of racial exclu39
sion practiced by the local construction industry.
34. Section IIcommands the support of only its author, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and
Justice White; Section I11A, only the support of these three Justices and Justice Kennedy.
35. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 721. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
White, Kennedy and Scalia adopted the strict scrutiny standard. Justice Stevens avoided
the issue and focuses instead on the need to identify the characteristics of disadvantaged
classes which might justify special treatment. Id. at 732.
36. Historically, virtually no legislative action has withstood strict scrutiny analysis;
the application of strict scrutiny is usually the death knell of the challenged provision.
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine On a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). There are rare
exceptions in which a legislative classification has survived strict scrutiny; e.g., Fullilove, 448
U.S. 448 (1980).
37. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 717.
38. Last term in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988),Justice
O'Connor struggled conceptually for a middle ground between the "stark and uninviting
alternatives ..."of whether to apply disparate impact analysis to subjective employment
decisionmaking (which alternative might induce employers to adopt surreptitious quota
systems) or to restrict disparate impact analysis to objective employment practices (which
alternatives might induce all employers to interject subjective elements and so invalidate
the disparate impact model entirely). Id. at 2786. But her introduction of a newly articulated disparate impact proof model (now confirmed by Wards Cove Packing Co., infra at p.
66) belied her conceptual struggle. See, Holdeman, Watson v:Fort Worth Bank and Trust:
The Changing Face of Disparate Impact, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 179 (1989).
39. City of Richmond, 109 S.Ct. at 720. The decision in Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986) had raised doubt as to whether the State had authority to employ
race-conscious remedies to eradicate the effects of discrimination other than its own. Justices Kennedy and Scalia would so hold, but Justice Kennedy aptly noted that such a holding was not essential since the strict scrutiny standard was already sufficient to defeat the
Plan. City ofRichmond, 109 S. Ct. at 734. Justice Stevens' position was not fully fleshed out,
but would seem to be less limiting than Justice O'Connor's. Justice Stevens was willing to
consider compelling interests in present and future consequences, such as the school
board's argument in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), that an integrated faculty provided educational benefits to students. Id. at 731.
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Even more surely fatal for such legislation than the nature of, or
factual basis necessary to establish, the requisite compelling interest
(e.g., that race-conscious action is necessary to eradicate the effects of
past discrimination, and that such discrimination was practiced by the
city or that the city was a passive participant in discrimination by the
local industry) is the level of proof which is required to establish the
factual basis. The proof requirements imposed by the majority reject
normal circumstantial proof and exceed proof requirements in civil
40
litigation.
In finding the city's interest in race-conscious action justified, the
district court had relied upon the following evidence: (1) the congressional determination that past discrimination in the construction industry had resulted in stifled minority participation on both national and
local levels, and the congressional studies and hearings which supported
that determination; (2) the fact that MBEs were awarded only 0.67% of
city construction dollars while minorities constituted roughly 50% of the
city's population; (3) the fact that there were almost no MBEs represented in local contractors' associations; (4) the testimony of witnesses
that widespread discrimination was practiced in the local construction
industry; and (5) the ordinance's express declaration of its remedial
purpose.
First, the majority discounted both the congressional declaration of
industry discrimination and the array of congressional and agency studies which were sufficient to uphold the congressional minority set-aside
approved in Fulilove. Congress had essentially created a presumption,
applicable to each state and local jurisdiction, that construction industry
discrimination had stifled minority participation. But a state or local
government could rebut the presumption by showing evidence negating
4
any local discrimination. '
The majority in City of Richmond reasoned away the proof value of
the congressional presumption of discrimination by holding that, because
it was rebuttable, it had "extremely limited" probative value. 42 This
40. The majority suggested that evidence akin to aprimafaciecase against named persons would be required. "There is nothing approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation by anyone in the Richmond construction industry." City of
Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 724 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 729, where Justice
O'Connor criticized the Plan because "there is no inquiry into whether or not the particular MBE seeking a racial preference has suffered from the effects of past discrimination by
the city or prime contractors."
41. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 487 (1980). The authority for Fultilove's
declaration that the congressional set aside program provided local governments the opportunity to demonstrate the lack of local discrimination is unclear. The statute itself does
not provide for such a waiver. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f(2) (1982). Section 6706 empowers the
Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Economic Development Agency, to prescribe
regulations implementing the set-aside provision. Those regulations allow a waiver if
there are no MBEs in a "reasonable trade area," but make no mention of rebutting the
presumption of discrimination in the local construction industry.
42. The probative value of [the congressional] findings for demonstrating the
existence of discrimination in Richmond is extremely limited. By its inclusion of
a waiver procedure in the national program addressed in Fullilove, Congress explicitly recognized that the scope of the problem would vary from market area to
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proposition is contrary to any conventional understanding of the effect
of a presumption.
The minimum operative effect of a presumption is that it shifts the
burden of producing evidence with regard to the presumed fact, at least
until some contrary evidence is offered. 43 In City of Richmond, the city
counsel began with the congressional presumption, and then heard additional evidence which supported the presumption. Not one witness or
fact called the presumption into question, either during the fact finding
process, 44 or later at trial. 45 So the majority's treatment of the evidentiary value of the presumption is puzzling indeed.
Second, the majority reasoned away the congressional evidence
which was the foundation for the presumption by pointing to the congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amendment under section
five, a power not conferred upon state and local governments. 4 6 The
majority did not explain the non sequitur that a difference in enforcement power would affect the probative value of evidence itself.
The opinion also discounted the congressional evidence because it
was national in scope rather than specific to the City of Richmond.
Although the Court is correct in noting the national scope of such evidence, the congressional facts and findings did include direct evidence
that the pattern of discrimination in the construction industry existed in
47
state and local public construction contracting.
Moreover, the majority rejected the testimony of local witnesses to
"widespread" discrimination, including even the testimony of the city
manager who supervised city procurement matters, as being too general
and too conclusory, 4 8 despite the fact that the testimony of witnesses
such as the city manager would normally be regarded as expert rather
than lay testimony and would thus be entitled to include expert conclusions. 4 9 The Court held that the city council's declaration of remedial
purpose was too self-serving to be entitled to weight, despite principles
of comity and the deference generally accorded to the factfinding process of legislative bodies. However, as Justice Marshall observed, the
Court has held that "[l]ocal officials, by virtue of their proximity to, and
their expertise with, local affairs, are exceptionally well-qualified to
make determinations of public good 'within their respective spheres of
authority.' "50
market area. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 487 (noting that the presumption that mi-

nority firms are disadvantaged by past discrimination may be rebutted by grantees in individual situations).
City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 726.
43.

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 973-76 (E. Cleary ed. 3d. ed. 1984).

44.
45.
46.
47.

City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 743 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 749.
Id. at 726-727.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980).

48.

City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 743, n.5 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

49. Part of the function of an expert witness is to draw inferences from the facts which
a factfinder would not be competent to draw, or to offer an expert opinion which will aid
the factfinder in understanding the facts. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, at 33.
50.

City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 748 (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (quoting from Hawaii
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Finally, the Court rejected the most telling evidence of all, the gross
statistical disparity between the percentage of the city's minority popula5
tion and the percentage of prime contracts awarded to minority firms. '
Rather than comparing the contract dollars awarded to MBEs with the
general population statistics, Justice O'Connor held that the proper statistical model is the comparison between the contract dollars awarded to
MBEs and the number of existing qualified MBEs. No doubt the conceptual justification for this choice is the rejection of race-conscious
52
preference as a remedy for historic society-wide discrimination.
However, the evidentiary result is inappropriate. The Court's effort
to isolate past discrimination in the construction industry from past society-wide discrimination effectively deprives the statistical tool of its ability to measure past discrimination of any kind. It is elementary market
place economics that few small businesses subject to significant limitations in procuring business opportunities will long survive. Nor does
the majority's statistical formula account for the numbers of MBEs
which might have been formed but for widespread knowledge in the minority community of industry discrimination. Only the foolish would
undertake to acquire the "special qualifications" which Justice
O'Connor correctly observes are necessary, 53 when other such minority
enterprises are failing on all sides.
Use of qualified labor market statistics are appropriate in some contexts. The Court has correctly required such a statistical analysis when
the task is to measure current discrimination. 5 4 But a requirement of
qualified labor market statistics is manifestly inappropriate when, as
here, the task is to measure the effects of past discrimination. While
some portion of the disparity between contracts awarded and general
population statistics may be due to society-wide discrimination, it is unlikely that a local society which discriminated to the extent evidenced by
the Richmond statistics would be home to a construction industry free of
that same sort of discrimination. This kind of reasoning process is precisely the nature and function of circumstantial evidence in a
55
courtroom.
The same problems are apparent in the Court's rejection of the
city's evidence that MBE membership in area trade organizations was
extremely low. The Court held that this evidence would be relevant
only if it were compared to the number of MBEs eligible for membership. But again this sort of statistical comparison can only measure current discrimination; it cannot measure the effect of past discrimination
which has resulted in a dearth of local MBEs. And again, even if some
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)); see also Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 777-78 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
51. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 725.
52. Id.
53.

Id.

54. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
55. See infra p. 79.
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portion of the disparity were due to societal discrimination, the Court's
conclusion that the membership statistics had no probative value reflects
a further rejection of normal circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence which requires additional reasoning to reach the proposition to which it is directed; 56 in effect, it isevidence that circumstances are as one would expect them to be if the
fact in question were true. In City of Richmond, much of the rejected or
undervalued evidence is circumstantial in nature. The congressional
record and legislation created a presumption that discrimination in the
local construction industry had caused the low level of minority participation in the industry. The dearth of minority contractors in the area
trade associations, and the dearth of minority contractors awarded
prime contracts constituted strong circumstantial evidence in support of
the presumption. Yet the Court rejected this evidence because although
the national statistics established a nationwide pattern of industry discrimination, the Richmond statistics might be the result of entrepreneurial choices made by blacks in Richmond; or the Richmond
statistics might be a result of societal discrimination rather than industry
discrimination. This hypothesis implicitly conjectures that Richmond's
construction industry, though a part of a local society which discriminated three times as much as the national construction industry (which
itself was grossly discriminatory) was untainted by either local or national racism.
These examples demonstrate the Court's rejection of the normal
function of circumstantial evidence. They also raise the question of
what standard of proof was required by the Court's strict scrutiny analysis. The majority seemed to be requiring far more than clear and convincing evidence. By requiring the city to disprove such unlikely causes
as the possibility that blacks in Richmond, Virginia have equal access to
the construction industry, but choose instead to become bankers or university professors, the Court seems to be requiring nothing less than
proof to a moral certainty. In order to justify a remedial racial classification by a state or local government, the Court required proof tantamount to a criminal conviction of an industry. On the face of the
opinion, remedial legislation is subjected to the same fatal constitutional
standard as anti-minority segregation statutes. Such a construction of
the fourteenth amendment is incongruous with its historical context and
the traditional rationale underlying strict scrutiny. The fourteenth
amendment and strict scrutiny did not arise in a historical vacuum, and
are not predicated on an abstract principle that race consciousness is
malum en se. Rather, they are remedial measures to eradicate the pernicious effects of anti-minority segregation statutes. Race-conscious remedial legislation has not been so pernicious and can hardly bear the
same historical and cultural stigma as Jim Crow laws. Yet the City of Richmond decision holds both forms of legislation to be equally suspect.
56. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, at 543.
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Not only did the majority underrate the probative value of each individual piece of evidence, but it failed entirely to consider the cumulative weight of the evidence. Repeatedly the majority held that the
specific evidence being discussed was insufficient, "standing alone," to
justify remedial action. 57 Nowhere did the majority consider the combined probative value of the city's direct and circumstantial evidence of
discrimination. The device of separately analyzing items of circumstantial proof in isolation is a classic method of de-valuing each item. However, as Professor McCormick has observed:
But when [circumstantial evidence] is offered and judged singly
and in isolation, as it frequently is, it cannot be expected by
itself to furnish conclusive proof of the ultimate fact to be inferred. Thus the common argument of the objector that the
inference for which the fact is offered "does not necessarily follow" is untenable, as it supposes a standard of conclusiveness
which probably no aggregation of circumstantial evidence,
and
58
certainly no single item thereof, could ever meet.
Moreover, strict scrutiny analysis requires more than evidence sufficient to prove the existence of past industry discrimination. The evidence must be specific enough to enable the governmental actor to
prove that the scope of the race-conscious remedy does not exceed the
compelling interest which justifies it. 59 A strict and rigid construction of
such an inherently difficult task would effectively prevent any race-conscious action, and such seems to be the effect, if not the intent, of the
majority opinion. Just as it would be "sheer speculation how many minority firms there would be in Richmond absent past societal discrimination," 60 it is and always will be "sheer speculation" how many minority
firms there would be in Richmond absent past construction industry discrimination. To require proof of that sort renders defense of race-conscious remedial legislation a virtual impossibility. The statistical
evidence in City of Richmond forced a choice between running the risk of
addressing some societal discrimination in an affirmative action program
and failing to address any past discrimination including industry discrimination. The majority's choice of the latter option reveals that the
Court is willing to leave even industry discrimination unredressed rather
than risk imposing on a particular industry any share of the burden of
61
redressing societal discrimination.
The majority opinion devoted little attention to the second prong of
equal protection analysis, narrow tailoring. Justice O'Connor observed
that the lack of quantified proof of precisely identified discrimination
57. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 723-728 (1989).
58. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 436 (E. Cleary ed. 2d ed. 1972).
59. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 726-728.
60. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
61. Even if the 30% set-aside did partially address societal discrimination, the burden
on the industry was almost non-existent. As Justice Marshall pointed out, public construction accounted for only 3% of local construction. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Thus the set-aside affected only 1%, and if even half of the set-aside addressed societal
discrimination, that would affect only 0.5% of Richmond's construction market.

CIVIL RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT

1990]

rendered the determination
of whether the Plan was narrowly tailored
"almost impossible." '6 2 In addition, she pointed to the city's failure to
first consider race-neutral alternatives and failure to justify the selection
of thirty percent as the set-aside percentage. 63 Finally, she found fault
with Richmond's adoption of the congressional definition of an MBE,
64
which included Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut business owners,
65
and with the unlimited geographic scope of the Plan.
Certainly race-conscious state action should not be undertaken if
there are viable alternatives. However, it would have been reasonable to
find that the city had concluded that other alternatives were ineffective.
In 1975, the city had enacted a city code provision prohibiting discrimination by contractors. 66 Yet there were still virtually no minority-owned
contractors in area trade associations. Further, the congressional record
before the city council included the congressional finding that alternatives other than race-conscious action were not effective to address the
effects of past discrimination in the construction industry. 6 7 Nonethe-

less, the record was not strong that the city had genuinely considered
alternatives to the set-aside provision.
The majority's objection that the selection of the thirty percent figure was not justified by the city is less compelling. As Justice Marshall
observed, the thirty percent figure was patterned directly on the method
of calculation approved in Fullilove.68 Congress had selected its ten percent figure because it fell roughly halfway between the percentage of
minority contractors and the percentage of minority population. Application of the same calculation to the city's evidence yielded the thirty
percent figure. The calculation allowed a healthy margin to account for
the effects of societal discrimination, and yet provided a significant encouragement to the entry of minority owned businesses in the market.
Nor did the thirty percent figure key to "outright racial balancing"
or rest upon the "assumption that minorities will choose a particular
trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population" 69 as Justice O'Connor stated. Instead, the thirty percent figure
provided a cushion of roughly fifty percent to allow for societal discrimination, career choices, or other factors effecting the dearth of minorities
in the market.
The majority's insistence on strong evidence that the race-conscious remedy does not overstep the effects of past industry discrimination is one of the most serious evidentiary hurdles in the strict scrutiny
analysis. Logically, it should be possible to overcome this hurdle, despite the impossibility of distinguishing the effects of industry discrimi62. Id. at 728.
63.

Id.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 713.
Id.
Richmond, Va., Code, 17.2 (1985).
City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 751-52.
Id.at 728.
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nation from societal discrimination with certainty and precision, if the
race-conscious remedy is limited so as to provide reasonable assurance
that it did not exceed the bounds of the effects of past industry discrimination. The City of Richmond formula effectively conceded half of the existing disparity to societal discrinination and so refrained from
redressing the disparity beyond the thirty percent remedy. Yet the majority's rejection of Richmond's thirty percent calculation is an implicit
rejection of this method of insuring that the race-conscious remedy does
not overstep its bounds.
Nor does the Court offer any explanation of its rejection. If the
Court's reason for requiring evidentiary precision is, in fact, the legitimate concern that race-conscious remedies should be limited to the effects of past industry discrimination, there is no reason to reject a Plan
that settles for a substantially smaller race-conscious remedy than past
discrimination might justify. A fifty percent cushion surely insures that
the remedy does not inadvertently address societal discrimination to any
significant degree. It would appear then, that the insistence on precision, even when unnecessary to accomplish the Court's stated justification, is simply another device to insure the demise of race-conscious
remedies.
In its defense of the new strict scrutiny standard, the Court relies on
the assertion that this Plan was imposed on the construction industry by
a black majority. 70 However, the Court does not limit the application of
strict scrutiny to that context. Indeed such a characterization of the City
of Richmond facts is questionable. The Court inferred that the Plan resulted from overreaching by a racial majority because the population of
Richmond was fifty-two percent black (failing to inquire as to the racial
breakdown of registered voters), the city council was composed of four
whites and five blacks (though the vote on the Plan did not divide along
racial lines), the Plan included groups other than blacks in its definition
of MBEs (which logically tends to disprove rather than support the
Court's inference), and the Plan's failure to restrict MBEs to local businesses (which also tends to negate a charge of self-interested overreaching by a local majority). The Court's readiness to find illicit discrimination by a black majority stands in dramatic contrast to the presumption of innocence afforded the white construction industry.
Yet the larger issue raised by the Court, concerning remedial legislation which favors a group which constitutes the majority within a given
jurisdiction, is a real issue and must be answered. The most oppressive
discrimination against racial groups has often occurred in localities
where those racial groups are a numerical majority of the populace. The
overall statutory scheme of the 1960's civil rights legislation relied substantially on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to empower disadvantaged
racial groups to enact state and local legislation to redress the inherited
legacy of socio-economic injustice. As the Voting Rights Act begins to
70. Id. at 722.
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achieve its purpose, the strict scrutiny standard is invoked to thwart any
translation of political equality into economic equality.
It is admittedly appropriate for the federal courts to remain especially alert to preclude legislative oppression of minorities by majorities.
However, the strict scrutiny standard, as implemented in City of Richmond, exceeds cautious regard for fair treatment of a racial minority. It
is the denial of political redress for racial discrimination. Political action
by a majority which is socially and economically marginalized is simply
not equivalent to political action by a majority which is also socially and
economically dominant. The earlier standard of intermediate review
was appropriate to safeguard the interests of an economically dominant
numerical minority. The City of Richmond strict scrutiny standard denies
both the democratic interest in allowing majority rule and the social policy in favor of achieving equal opportunity for economically marginalized racial groups. The judicial over-riding of majority rule is
appropriate to curtail oppression but not to thwart the redress of legitimate grievances.
71
The significance of City of Richmond would be hard to overstate.
The adoption of strict scrutiny analysis applies to all governmental raceconscious action, and will generally defeat all such efforts. 7 2 Further, it
signals that private voluntary affirmative action is in jeopardy, and that
judicially imposed race-conscious remedies will be closely examined.
2.

Martin v. Wilks (collateral attack upon consent decree)

In 1974, a group of black individuals and a branch of the NAACP
filed class actions against the City of Birmingham, Alabama, alleging racial discrimination in hiring and promotion in city employment. After
trial but before a judgment was entered, the parties agreed to the entry
of consent decrees setting out extensive remedial hiring and promotion
goals. 73 The district court published notices and held fairness hearings
on the proposed decrees. The Birmingham Firefighters Association
("BFA") appeared as amicus curiae and filed objections to the proposed
decrees. After the hearings, the BFA also moved to intervene on the
grounds that the decrees would affect the rights of its members. The
district court denied the motion as untimely and subsequently approved
and entered the decrees. 74 Seven white members of the BFA then filed
suit against the city seeking an injunction against enforcement of the
decrees on the grounds that the decrees would illegally discriminate
71. One intriguing result of City of Richmond may be its effect on the level of scrutiny
adopted for sex discrimination. If white males constitute a "suspect classification" it may
be difficult to maintain intermediate scrutiny of discrimination against women. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
72. As Justice Marshall correctly observes, "strict scrutiny is strict in theory, fatal in
fact." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. at 752 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518-19 (1980)).
73. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
74. United States v.Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1834 (N.D. Ala.
1981).
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against them. The district court denied injunctive relief. 75 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief, both on the basis that the white firefighters could file a Title
76
VII action asserting specific violations under the consent decrees.
A third group of non-minority plaintiffs then brought suit against
the city, alleging denials of promotions because of their race. The city
admitted making race-conscious hiring and promotion decisions pursuant to the consent decrees but moved to dismiss the complaint as an
impermissible collateral attack 77 on the earlier decrees. The district
court granted the motion to dismiss.

78

The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs' claims
were not precluded because they had not been parties to the litigation
which resulted in the consent decrees. The court recognized the
"strong public policy in favor of voluntary affirmative action plans" 79
which had caused most other circuits to preclude collateral attack by
non-parties to consent decrees. 80 However, the Eleventh Circuit found
the due process interests of non-minority employees to outweigh the
public policy interest in equal employment opportunity. The Supreme
8
Court granted certiorari. '
In an opinion which opened thousands of consent decrees to collateral attack by non-minority employees, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Eleventh Circuit. The facts of Martin present a relatively compelling due
process claim favoring the non-minority employees, as they or their
privies in interest had attempted during the initial litigation and immediately thereafter to present their case as parties, and had been denied that
opportunity. The holding of Martin, however, is not limited to cases in
which non-minority employees have been so vigilant or have been denied a prior opportunity to assert their claims in a timely manner. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, joined by Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. The majority recognized that a nonparty may intervene pursuant to Rule 24, or may be involuntarily joined
pursuant to Rule 19. However, since Rule 24 intervention is82permissive,
the failure to intervene may not be given preclusive effect.
The fallout from Martin could be enormous. Of the hundreds of
thousands of operative voluntary affirmative action plans affecting mil75. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2181.
76. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518, 1520 (11 th Cir. 1983).
77. Collateral attack on a judgment is permissible only if the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or if the judgment is the product of corruption, duress, fraud,
collusion, or mistake. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 69-72 (1982); Griffith v.
Bank of New York, 147 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 874 (1945).
78. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2181.
79. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492,
1498 (11 th Cir. 1987).
80. See, e.g., Thaggard v. City ofJackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 900 (1983); Dennison v. City of Los Angeles, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981); EEOC v.
McCall Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1980).
81. Martin v. Wilks, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988).
82. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2182.
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lions of employees, 83 a significant percentage are either consent decrees
or judicially imposed decrees. All of these decrees are now in some degree ofjeopardy. Since the factual basis for most collateral attacks on
decrees would be current employment decisions taken pursuant to the
decrees, there would seem to be no applicable statute of limitations
which would protect the decrees. The limitations period for both a fourteenth amendment claim and a Title VII claim would commence with
the specific employment decision being challenged, and not upon the
entry of the decree. 84 Thus, for those many decrees entered without
formal party participation of non-plaintiff employees, any currently aggrieved employee can now challenge the decree.
For those decrees resulting from litigation in which non-plaintiff
employees participated as parties, the degree of vulnerability will depend largely on whether the district and circuit courts are willing to find
sufficient identity of interest between the employee parties and the currently aggrieved employee. 8 5 For instance, a current plaintiff claiming
sex discrimination would not necessarily have sufficient identity of interest with white male intervening employees in the original Title VII
action.
The uncertain status of all existing decrees poses an awkward problem, not only for women and minority employees whose employment
rights are rendered dubious, but also for employers who are faced with
potential monetary liability whether they comply with or defy the standing court orders. Indeed, the employer's position is rendered all the
more precarious by the fact that cases, long since resolved, may now be
relitigated before new judges appointed during the Reagan years.
3.

Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes (attorneys' fees
against intervenors)

Following quickly on the heels of Martin, the Court's decision in
Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes 86 further opened the door for
challenges to existing and proposed remedial decrees. In 1970, a group
of female flight attendants brought suit against Trans World Airlines
("TWA"), challenging its policy of terminating the employment of flight
attendants who became pregnant. One month after suit was filed TWA
abandoned its policy of pregnancy-based discharges, and shortly thereafter, the parties reached a settlement agreement which included an
award of competitive 8 7 seniority for the class members.
83.

Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over But the Shouting, 86

MICH. L. REV. 524, 525 (1987).
84. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F.2d
1492, 1498 (1987). Compare Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989),
discussed infra p. 40.
85. See Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1498.
86. 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
87. "Competitive seniority" refers to seniority used to award scarce benefits to competing employees. "Noncompetitive seniority" or "benefit seniority" refers to seniority
used to award employment benefits which are available to all employees without competition. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976).
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At this point, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
("IFFA") was granted leave to intervene to oppose the award of competitive seniority to the plaintiffs. IFFA argued that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to award relief to time-barred class members and that the
award of competitive seniority would violate the collective-bargaining
agreement between IFFA and TWA. The district court rejected IFFA's
arguments and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 88 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed the district and circuit courts on both
issues. 89
Plaintiffs then successfully petitioned the district court for an award
of attorneys' fees against IFFA under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The more
than twelve years of litigation, including five appeals, had virtually all
resulted from the objections of the intervenors and their predecessors in
interest, as TWA had ceased its challenged practice almost immediately
after suit was filed. The district court held that "unsuccessful Title VII
union intervenors are, like unsuccessful Title VII defendants, consistafently held responsible for attorneys' fees." 90 The Seventh Circuit 93
92
firmed, 9 1 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Title VII's attorneys' fee provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides for a
discretionary award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 9 4 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 the Court had ruled that a Title VII prevailing plaintiff is to be awarded attorneys' fees against an unsuccessful
employer in all but special circumstances. In ChristiansburgGarment Co. v.
EEOC,9 6 the Court ruled that a prevailing defendant is to be awarded
attorneys' fees only when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. 9 7 The distinction between the two standards
was based upon the strong policy in favor of enabling plaintiffs to bring
Title VII suits, the plaintiff's status as a private attorney general and the
unsuccessful defendant's status as a violator of federal law. 9 8 The
Supreme Court had never ruled on the standard to be applied to fee
awards against intervenors; however, the district and circuit court authority almost uniformly supported fee awards against intervenors using
the same basis as awards against defendants. 99
88. Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n Local 550 v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
630 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980).
89. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
90. Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n Local 550, TWU, AFL-CIO v. Trans
1986).
World Airlines, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 861, 867 (N.D. Ill.
91. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 846 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1988).
92. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S.Ct. 835 (1989).
93. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S.Ct. 2732 (1989).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
95. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
96. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
97. Id. at 415-421.
98. Id. at 418-419.
99. See, e.g., Morten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers, 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979); Allen v. Terminal Transp.
Co., 486 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Terminal Transp.
Co., 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); Van Hoomissen v.
Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City
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Justice Scalia delivered the opinion in Zipes, writing for a five Justice
majority.' 0 0 The Court held that attorneys' fees may be awarded against
intervenors in Title VII litigation only upon a finding that the intervenors' action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 10 The
Court's reasoning focused almost entirely upon the "innocent" status of
an intervenor defending its "rights," even if unsuccessfully, and referred
to intervenors as "particularly welcome since we have stressed the necessity of protecting, in Title VII litigation, 'the legitimate expectations
of... employees innocent of any wrongdoing,' Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977)."102
Justice Scalia reasoned that the Court's ruling in Martin v. Wilks 103
effectively required the stricter standard for fee awards against intervenors. Under Martin, employees objecting to a Title VII remedy may
either intervene prior to judgment or may collaterally attack the remedy
after judgment. In a collateral attack, the objecting employees would be
Title VII plaintiffs, presumptively shielded from a fee award upon losing, and presumptively entitled to a fee award upon winning. If, as intervenors, unsuccessful objecting employees were presumptively liable
for fees, Justice Scalia reasoned that objecting employees would be
10 4
more likely to opt for post-judgment collateral attack.
This reasoning heightens the impact of both Martin and Zipes. Absent Zipes, it would be far from clear that Martin plaintiffs attacking Title
VII decrees would be entitled to the same favored treatment which Albemarle Paper Co. and ChristiansburgGarment Co. had afforded to plaintiffs
seeking to further the goals of Title VII. This holding invites third-party
challenges to Title VII claims with the same incentives heretofore offered to invite the assertion of such claims, reflecting a major shift in
public policy not supported by the legislative history of the statute. The
Zipes fee standard is therefore framed so as to remove any disincentive to
non-minority employees' prompt defense against minority claims. Nor
was the Court willing to limit its holding to fees incurred to defend the
remedy, as opposed to fees incurred to defend against arguments as to
liability. The Zipes majority held that either sort of argument, made by
an intervenor, is made for the purpose of defending its own employment
rights, and that such a purpose is "entitled to no less respect than
of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ohio, 1984); Thompson v. Sawyer, 586 F. Supp. 635
(D.D.C. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Vulcan Soc'y of Westchester County v. Fire Dep't, 533 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Cf. Charles v. Daley, 846
F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988); Robideau v. O'Brien, 525 F. Supp. 878 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
100. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy and Scalia constituted the majority. Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Brennan dissented. Justice Stevens
took no part in the case.
101. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
102. Id. at 2735.
103. Objecting employees may still be inclined to choose collateral attack, since as successful Title VII plaintiffs, they would be presumptively entitled to a fee award from the
employer defendant. Thus Justice Scalia's reasoning actually supports Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion which would hold that the adjudicated Title VII violator, the employer, should bear the plaintiff's attorneys' fees expended against the intervenors.
104. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. at 2736-38.
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the rights asserted by [a Title VII plaintiff]."' 10 5
Martin and Zipes are a powerful duo. Together they declare open
season on thousands of existing remedial decrees, and on all future remedial decrees. The Court has issued a clear invitation to non-minority
employees to challenge claims made by minority litigants-claims, which
were heretofore resisted principally by employer defendants. Indeed,
the door is wide open to collusive arrangements whereby the employer
may substantially delegate the defense of its case to non-minority employee intervenors, thus all but nullifying § 1988.
B.

Seniority Systems
1. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. (statute of limitations for
Title VI claim)

While it may be open season on remedial decrees, the season is essentially closed on bona fide seniority systems. In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,106 a decision issued on the same day as Martin, the Court
limited a Title VII plaintiff's opportunity to attack intentional 10 7 discrimination in a seniority system to a 180/300 day' 0 8 period immediately following the system's enactment, whether or not the system has
yet harmed any minority employee.
Prior to 1979, AT&T's seniority system computed a worker's competitive seniority' 0 9 based upon years of plantwide service. No change
in seniority occurred upon promotion to the more skilled and better
paid "tester" position. Tester positions had almost exclusively been
held by men, and nontester positions had been held predominantly by
women.
In the mid-1970's, women began to exercise their seniority rights to
qualify as testers. In 1979, AT&T and Local 1942, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO entered into a collective bargaining agreement which changed the manner of calculating tester
seniority. For a tester with less than five years in a tester's position, the
new system calculated seniority based only on years as a tester, and discounted completely years in other plant positions. Testers with more
regain full
than five years in a tester position (mostly men) could
0
plantwide seniority by completing a training program.
During 1982 an economic downturn necessitated demotions, which
105. Id. at 2738.
106. 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
107. In a challenge to a seniority system, intentional discrimination is the only vehicle
open to a Title VII plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). For a potential disparate impact
challenge, the statute already gives conclusive deference to the expectations of non-minority workers, no matter how disparate the effect of the seniority system upon minorities.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC
within 180 days of the occurrence of the challenged action. If the complainant has first
instituted proceedings in a 706 deferral (state or local) agency, this limitations period is
extended to 300 days.
109. See Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2263 n.1.
110. Id. at 2261.
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were accomplished by seniority ranking. The Lorance plaintiffs, women
who had become testers between 1978 and 1980, were demoted, though
they had greater plantwide seniority than men who were retained as testers. They promptly filed administrative charges and then filed suit, alleging that the 1979 alteration of the seniority calculation formula was
the product of a conspiracy between the company and the union to protect incumbent male testers and to discourage women from seeking the
traditionally male tester jobs. I II AT&T sought summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations began to run upon adoption of the
seniority system in 1979, and that it had expired by at least 300 days
after the adoption of the system. The plaintiffs argued that the continued use of a seniority system is an ongoing violation of Title VII if the
system is designed, operated and maintained with the intent to
discriminate. 112
The district court staked a middle ground. The court refused to
completely insulate an intentionally discriminatory seniority system after
its first 180/300 days, but also refused to permit a plaintiff to wait to
challenge the system until it had actually operated to her detriment.
The court held that the limitations period begins to run for each employee at the time that employee becomes subject to the discriminatory
system. 1 13 Therefore, while the Lorance plaintiffs' claims were time
barred, there would be a continuous supply of possible plaintiffs as new
employees were hired. 114 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari115 to decide the statute
of limitations issue.' 16
Justice Scalia, who authored the Martin opinion, also wrote for the
Lorance majority. The Court held that the limitations period commenced
upon the adoption of the system,"1 7 and thus completely protected intentionally discriminatory seniority systems more than 300 days old.
The Court's ruling was based upon a theoretical construct focusing on
the date of the "intent" required by § 703(h), and upon seniority as a
present contract right (albeit a right to favorable treatment in a future
situation which might or might not arise). Justice Scalia wrote:
Under the collective bargaining agreements in effect prior to
111. Id.
112. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 827 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1987).
113. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 167.
115. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988).
116. The majority of circuits had embraced the "continuing violation" theory advocated by the Lorance plaintiffs. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744,
750-51 (4th Cir. 1980) (continued application of unlawful seniority system constitutes
"continuing violation," hence not time barred by failure to challenge system at inception);
Cook v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 771 F.2d 635, 646 (2d Cir. 1985) (maintenance of discriminatory seniority system constitutes continuing violation of ADEA); Morelock v. NCR Corp., 586 F.2d 1096, 1103 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979)
("continuing violation" of ADEA); but cf Bronze Shields, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't. of Civil Serv.,
667 F.2d 1074, 1077 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982) (discussion of precedent and commentary regarding "continuing violation" theory).
117. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2264 (1989).
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1979, each petitioner had earned the right to receive a
favorable position in the hierarchy of seniority among testers (if
and when she became a tester), and respondents eliminated
those rights for reasons alleged to be discriminatory. Because
this diminution in employment status occurred in 1979 [petitioner's claims are time-barred]. 118
Thus, under the Lorance holding, testers hired more than 300 days after
the adoption of the discriminatory system would never have a right to
challenge it. Nor would current testers who were unaware of the offending provision in the new system, with the possible exception of those
who could demonstrate that their employer acted affirmatively to conceal the discriminatory provision. Further, it is unclear whether other
plant employees who, at the time the seniority system was adopted, aspired to become testers would have standing to challenge the discriminatory system. While the logical extension of Justice Scalia's language
would seem to support standing, it is doubtful that this Court would be
particularly receptive to a challenge to an entire seniority system based
merely upon a plaintiff's argument that she may one day wish to become
a tester.'

19

However, even if the Court adopts an expansive notion of standing
to challenge seniority systems, the actual effect of Lorance will be essentially the same. For most plaintiffs, the risks and practical considerations
inherent in filing suit against a current employer outweigh all but the
most sure and serious harm. Few are the employees who will be willing
to challenge a system which has not yet, and may never, cause them any
harm. Fewer still are the attorneys who would undertake such a case,
promising no back pay award, especially since the case may be defended
by intervenors protecting their seniority claims so that the chance of a
20
substantial attorneys' fee award is diminished.'
Perhaps most striking, though, is the juxtaposition of Lorance and
Martin. Under Lorance, victims of intentional discrimination, accomplished by a unilateral and perhaps undisclosed act on the part of their
employer, must immediately file a charge or lose their right to challenge
the discrimination. This is so whether or not they are yet harmed and
indeed whether or not they are even aware of the discriminatory act.
Under Martin, white men who wish to oppose remedial relief for victims
of adjudicated prior discrimination may, at any time, challenge a judgment, despite the fact that it was entered only after direct notice to
them, and after contested hearings covering all aspects of the proposed
decree. Under Lorance, minorities and women hired after an intentionally discriminatory seniority system is 300 days old must rely on those
who were employed during the first 300 days to protect their rights,
whether or not those earlier employees were or would be harmed by the
118. Id. at 2263-64.
119. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
§ 3531 (1984).
120. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
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seniority system. Under Martin, white males are expressly not required
to rely on earlier employees to protect their rights.
Admittedly the issues raised by claims barred by a statute of limitations (particularly in the context of seniority systems on which other employees have relied for years) and claims based on collateral attack of a
systemic equitable decree are set in different doctrinal contexts and
there are some differing policy considerations. However, the overriding
concern for the due process rights of non-minority employees in Martin
is notably not reflected in a corresponding concern for the due process
rights of women and minorities in Lorance. A minority employee may
rely on an operative Title VII decree as surely as a non-minority may
rely on an intentionally discriminatory seniority system. The interest in
prompt resolution of claims is present in both cases. Yet the Court has
elected to shield intentionally discriminatory seniority systems after 180
days, but exposes public judicial decrees to attack at any time. Again
this reflects a major shift in public policy. The implementation of Title
VII's original goals is curtailed, while the statute is turned against itself
to dismantle its own decrees.
2.

Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts (application of
the exception for seniority systems in ADEA claims)

Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts 121 is another limitation on challenges to seniority systems. Betts involved non-competitive
or benefit seniority in the context of an age discrimination claim.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")
proscribes employment discrimination based upon age. Section 4(a)(2)
forbids an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age."' 122 However, the ADEA
provides an exception for employment actions taken pursuant to the
terms of "any bona fide employee benefit plan, which is not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of" the Act. 123 The issue in Betts is the scope of
this exception.
The Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio ("PERS") was
established in 1933. PERS provides retirement and disability plans for
employees of the State of Ohio. An employee may only receive benefits
from one of these plans, and in 1959, PERS was amended to provide
that employees who are sixty and over may not receive benefits under
the disability plan. In 1967, the ADEA was enacted and in 1974 it became applicable to state governments. In 1976, PERS was amended to
include a minimum benefit amount payable under the disability plan,
but not under the retirement plan.
121. 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982).
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June Betts had been an employee of the State of Ohio since 1978.
Prior to 1985, she developed medical problems which continued to
worsen until, in 1985, her supervisor determined that Betts was no
longer physically able to perform herjob. Betts was given the option to
retire under the PERS retirement plan, but she was not eligible to receive disability benefits because she was sixty-one years old. Because
the minimum benefit award applied only to the disability plan, Betts'
monthly check was less than half of the amount which would have been
paid under the disability plan.
Betts brought suit against PERS, alleging a violation of the ADEA.
The district court found the PERS scheme to be discriminatory on its
face. At issue then was the scope of the exception for bona fide benefit
plans. The district court, relying on the EEOC interpretive regulation
that the exception applied only if any reductions in employee benefits
are justifiable by cost considerations, found that the exception did not
apply to the PERS provision. 12 4 The PERS provision was not justified
by increased cost and thus not covered by the exemption. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's decision,1 25 and the Supreme Court
26
noted probable jurisdiction.'
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, reaffirmed the
Court's earlier holding in United Air Lines v. McMann 127 that no preADEA action can be a subterfuge. 12 8 The Court then focused on the
scope of the exception as it applied to post-ADEA employment actions,
and specifically to the 1976 PERS amendment providing a minimum
payment for disability benefits.
The Court held that the EEOC's construction of the word "subterfuge" was contrary to the plain meaning of the ADEA, and thus that it
was entitled to no weight. 1 29 The Court then proceeded through a complex and sometimes convoluted exercise in statutory analysis, and ultimately concluded that a benefit plan is a "subterfuge" only if it is a
method of discriminating in other, "nonfringe-benefit aspect[s] of the
employment relation [ship]."
Additionally, the Court held that the "subterfuge" exception is not
an affirmative defense but is instead a part of the ADEA plaintiff's prima
facie case. Further, the plaintiff must prove actual intent on the part of
30
the employer in order to negate the application of the exception.'
The Court's holding that a pre-ADEA employment action cannot be
regarded as a subterfuge is correct. However, the construction of the
124. Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 631 F. Supp. 1198 (S.D.
Ohio 1986).
125. Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Development Disabilities,
848 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988).
126. Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 256 (1988).
127. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
128. Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2861
(1989).
129. Id. at 2862-65.
130. Id. at 2865-68.
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scope of the exception to exclude only those benefit plans which are a
method of discriminating in other aspects of the employment relationship is, as Justice Marshall pointed out, an immunization of "virtually all
employee benefit programs from liability" under the ADEA. 13 ' The
scope of the exception now protects even plans devised expressly for the
purpose of discriminating against older workers, and even if the reason
for the discrimination is the employer's hostility to or stereotypes of
older workers.
The conversion of the affirmative defense into an element of the
plaintiff's primafacie case and the requirement of proof of actual intent
will have limited practical impact, since most benefit plans will not affect
non-benefit employment actions covered by ADEA. However, even in
those cases where non-benefit actions are proven to be affected by the
benefit plan, it will be very difficult for the employee to prove as part of
its primafacie case that the employer intended such a secondary discriminatory impact. The most a plaintiff will usually be able to show is that
the employer operated from mixed motives. In that context, plaintiffs
may draw some comfort from the Price Waterhouse ruling that, at least in
the Title VII context, a plaintiff's showing that the employer was influenced by an impermissible motive, as well as by legitimate motives,
shifts to the defendant the burden of proving that it would have committed the same act absent the impermissible motive. However, in the
ADEA fringe benefit context, it may prove difficult for plaintiffs to capitalize on the Price Waterhouse rationale. To the extent that the courts will
apply the reasoning of Price Waterhouse in such cases, it seems to follow
that the employer need only show that it deliberately sought to discriminate against protected employees in the benefit package, and would
have done so even absent secondary discriminatory effects. There is no
need to justify or even claim a non-discriminatory business reason.
Betts is another expansion of the rights of employers, another burden placed upon plaintiffs, another category of employment decisions
placed beyond the reach of equal employment opportunity. The EEOC
interpretation of the bona fide employee benefit plan exception, heretofore accepted by the courts, construed the statute to accommodate legitimate business interests of the employer, that is, cost considerations.
The holding in Betts shields deliberate discrimination without regard to
any such legitimate need of the employer.
C.

Section 1981. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (applicability of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to private contracts)
In 1976, Runyan v. McCrary 132 held that the Reconstruction En-

forcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,1
131.
132.
133.
All

3

3

prohibits racial discrimination in

Id. at 2869.
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) provides as follows:
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
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the making and enforcement of private contracts. 134 In Runyan, two
black children had been denied admission to private schools expressly
because of their race. They filed suit, alleging that § 1981 prohibited
such racially discriminatory admissions policies. The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that the school's refusal to contract with the plaintiffs
based upon their race was a "classic violation of § 1981." 135
In 1987, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Supreme Court
granted certiorarito determine whether § 1981 applies to a claim of racial
harassment in employment.1 36 After oral argument, the Court shocked
courtwatchers and civil rights activists by setting Patterson over to the
next Term and requesting the parties to brief and argue the question of
l3 7
whether the Runyan holding should be reconsidered.
Patterson, a black woman, was employed by McLean Credit Union
from 1972 to 1982. She testified at trial that during her employment she
was given more work than white employees, subjected to racial slurs,
assigned more demeaning tasks than white employees, denied training
opportunities available to white employees, not notified of promotion
opportunities, passed over for the promotion opportunities she sought,
paid less than white employees, and singled out for scrutiny and public
criticism. She alleged that her selection for layoff was also based upon
her race. After the 1982 layoff, she filed suit, alleging that these actions
by the credit union had violated her civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.138 Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit held that
§ 1981 applied to her claims for failure to promote and discriminatory
discharge, but that § 1981 did not apply to her claims for racial harassment. 139 Other circuits had held that § 1981 reaches claims of maintenance of a hostile working environment and private racial
40
harassment. 1
The Supreme Court opinion was handed down at the end of the
1989 term. The Court declined to overturn Runyan though Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, did not conceal the reluctance of the subscribing justices in letting Runyan stand. 14 1 The decision is based
almost entirely on the "fundamental importance" of the doctrine of stare
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ....as is enjoyed by white citizens
134. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-460 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431,439-440 (1973); cf/Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-443 n.78 (1968).
135. Runyan, 427 U.S. at 172.
136. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 484 U.S. 814 (1987). The Court also granted
certiorari to review the jury instruction on the § 1981 promotion claim. See Section D.
infra.

137. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
138.

Patterson also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress under North

Carolina tort law. Patterson did not bring a Title VII claim, presumably because the limitations period had expired. 805 F.2d 1143, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986).
139. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986).
140. E.g., Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1256, 1255, 1256-1259
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Taylor v.Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir.
1981).
141.

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2369 (1989).
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decisis to the preservation of a judicial system not based upon arbitrary
discretion. 142
However, the majority emphatically precluded any broad reading of
§ 198 I's scope. The Court adopted the narrowest possible reading of
the "making" and the "enforcement" of contracts. According to Patterson, the "making" of a contract covers only the contract's formation, but
not subsequent problems arising from the conditions of continuing employment; "enforcement" of contracts covers only the right of access to
a legal process to resolve contract claims. 143 Under this strict construction, Patterson's claims of racial harassment, including the failure to
train, and the failure to give wage increases, were not actionable under
§ 1981.
Though the credit union had not argued that § 1981 did not reach
claims for failure to promote, the Court held that promotion claims are
actionable under § 1981 only where the promotion "rises to the level of
an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee
and the employer."1 44 The Court cautioned lower courts not to "strain
in an undue manner the language of § 1981" in making this determination, 145 but rather to adopt the same sort of narrow reading used in the
Patterson analysis.
What is the real significance of Patterson?'46 It is true that all of
Patterson's claims not reached by § 1981 are covered by Title VII. Indeed, Title VII's scope is more comprehensive and broader than
§ 1981.147 There are, however, some differences between the two statutes which make § 1981 more helpful to a civil rights plaintiff. Title
VII's 180/300 day statute of limitations' 48 is substantially shorter than
the customary two or three year statute of limitations applicable to
§ 1981 claims. 14 9 Section 1981 requires no complex administrative procedures prior to suit, as does Title VII.150 Section 1981 reaches conduct
by any person, while Title VII covers only employers of fifteen or more
142. Id. at 2370.
143. Id. at 2772-73.
144. Id. at 2377.
145. Id.
146. Some commentators argue that the greatest import of Patterson may prove to be in
the context of private associational and contractual relationships other than employment

claims. See L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 328-29 (2d ed. 1988).
147. For instance, § 1981 prohibits only racial and certain ethnic discrimination, while
Title VII proscribes private discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987). Section 1981
prohibits only purposeful discrimination, while Title VII proscribes both disparate tretment and disparage impact. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S.
375 (1982); See also, Sections D and E infra.
148. See supra note 6.
149. The statute of limitations governing a § 1981 claim corresponds with the state
statute of limitations governing personal injury. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S.
656, 660-62 (1987). In Owens v. Okura, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989), the Court held that, in
states with multiple personal injury limitations periods, the applicable provision, at least
for the purposes of § 1983, is the limitations period for general or residual personal injury
claims.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f)(1) (1982).
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persons, labor organizations, and certain conduct by employment agencies. 15 1 Section 1981 plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial, while Title VII
claims are tried to the court. Successful § 1981 plaintiffs may recover
broad equitable and legal relief, sometimes including punitive damages,
while Title VII relief is limited to back pay and affirmative job relief.
Patterson has cut off these § 1981 advantages from all but plaintiffs alleging discrimination in hiring.1 52 It is only the larger significance of some
of the other recent cases and the fact that the Court reluctantly reaffirmed Runyan which makes Patterson seem to pale by comparison.
On the one hand, Patterson reflects the real incongruity of leaving
the same employment relationships subject to both § 1981 and Title
VII, as § 1981 tends to undermine Title VII's statutory, administrative,
and equitable structure, allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the reasonable
protections afforded to employers. Such protections are the necessary
prerequisite to the aggressive equitable relief necessary to achieve the
goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On the other hand, the narrow
reading of § 1981 arbitrarily focuses on the inception of the employment relationship while allowing rampant discrimination in the ongoing
dynamic of that relationship. This focus disregards the legislative intent
and the public policy underlying § 1981. A far more coherent approach
to civil rights in the employment context could have been achieved if the
Court had found an implied partial repeal of § 1981 so as to exclude
from its coverage employment relationships governed by Title VII but
otherwise left § 1981's scope intact.
D.

Disparate Treatment causation)

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (standardof

The most commonly used proof model for a Title VII claim of intentional discrimination is the disparate treatment model. First articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' 5 3 the disparate treatment
model requires the plaintiff to present a primafacie case which disproves
the most common legitimate causes for the employer's action, thus raising an inference of discrimination.1 54 In a hiring context, for instance,
in order to establish a primafacie case, the plaintiff need only prove:
(i) that he belongs to a [protected group]; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
15 5
complainant's qualifications.
151.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Fifteen percent of employees are not covered by Title

VII. Carver, Employment Practices, Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 364, at 6 (July 17, 1989).
152. Under Patterson some claims of failure to promote may be considered as claims of

discrimination in hiring. See supra, p. 51.
153. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
154. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
155. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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In the second stage of proof, the defendant may rebut the inference
of discrimination simply by articulating some legitimate, nondiscrimina15 6
tory reason for the challenged employment decision.
In the third and final stage of the McDonnell Douglas model, the
plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the em1 57
ployer's articulated reason was a mere "pretext" for discrimination.
In other words, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's true motive
was based upon the plaintiff's membership in a protected group. But
what if the defendant's true motive was based partly upon plaintiff's race
or sex and partly upon the articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason? The Supreme Court answered this question in another 1989 case,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 15 8
Price Waterhouse is a nationwide professional accounting firm.
Partnership decisions are made through a series of steps beginning
when the partners ina local office submit the name of one of their senior
managers as a candidate for partnership. All partners in the firm then
have the opportunity to comment on the candidate. The firm's admissions committee reviews the comments and recommends to the policy
board that the candidate be accepted, rejected or placed on hold. The
policy board decides whether to submit the candidate's name to the entire partnership for a vote, to reject the candidate, or to place her on
hold. The comments by partners, and the decisions of the admissions
committee and the policy board are completely discretionary, employing
no guidelines or fixed criteria. 15 9
In 1982, Ann Hopkins had been employed at Price Waterhouse's
Office of Government Services in Washington, D.C. for five years. Her
performance had been excellent. As a senior manager she had successfully procured major contracts for the partnership and she was
respected and liked by her clients. The partners in her office praised her
skills and proposed her as a candidate for partnership that year. Only
seven of the 662 partners in the firm were women. Of the eighty-eight
candidates for partnership that year, Hopkins was the only woman.
However, the partners in her office and others who commented on her
candidacy also offered criticism, primarily centered on her lack of interpersonal skills in dealing with staff members and her "masculine" behavior. Partners commented that she was "macho," "overcompensated
for being a woman," "needed" a course at charm school, used un60
ladylike language, and was too aggressive. 1
At the conclusion of the candidacy process, the policy board decided to put Hopkin's candidacy on hold, and advised her to walk, talk
and dress "more femininely .... wear make-up, have her hair styled, and

wear jewelry."' 16 1 Subsequently, the partners in her local office refused
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 807.
Id.
109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
Id. at 1781.
Id. at 1782.
Id.
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to repropose her for partnership, resulting in constructive discharge. 16 2
Hopkins filed a Title VII suit against Price Waterhouse alleging discrimination in the partnership decision. Price Waterhouse articulated Hopkins' lack of interpersonal skills as the legitimate reason for her rejection
and argued that, even if impermissible sex stereotyping did taint the
candidacy process, the firm's legitimate reasons would have resulted in
the same decision.
The district court found that Price Waterhouse had violated Title
VII by giving credence to sexual stereotypes. On the issue of remedies,
the court held that Price Waterhouse could avoid equitable relief by
proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the
same decision absent the discrimination. The trial court ruled that Price
63
Waterhouse had not carried this "heavy burden."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed, but used a different analysis. The appeals court considered the mixed motive issue as part of the liability phase of the litigation,
holding that an employer could avoid a finding of a Title VII violation
by proving that legitimate reasons alone would have resulted in the
same decision. The circuit court agreed that the appropriate proof standard for this "affirmative defense" was clear and convincing evidence.
The Supreme Court found the circuits in disarray on the effect of mixed
16 5
motives in a Title VII case, 164 and granted certiorariin Price Waterhouse.
Justice Brennan wrote the Court's opinion. He was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, with concurring opinions by Justices White and O'Connor. The Court accepted the proposition that an
employer should not be held liable for violating Title VII if the employer would have made the same decision absent discriminatory motives. However, the Court rejected Price Waterhouse's argument that
the words "because of" mean "but-for causation," thus rejecting the
next step of that rationale: that "but-for causation" was part of a plain166
tiff's burden of proof.
Instead, the Court held that the causation language of Title VII,
16 7
". to discrimination ... because of... such individual's.., sex,"'
simply means that the discriminatory reason was a "motivating factor"
in the employment decision. The Court held that "but-for causation"
was an affirmative defense, based upon Title VII's policy of preserving
the employer's decision-making autonomy in areas not proscribed by
the statute. Thus, the burden of proving "but-for causation," as an affirmative defense, rests upon the employer. 16 8 The Brennan opinion
does not regard the creation of this affirmative defense as a change in
162.

See id. at 1781 n.i.

163. Id. at 1783.
164.

The holdings of the 11 circuits which had considered the effect of mixed motives

in Title VII cases reflect five different approaches to the issue. Id. at 1784 n.2.
165. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
166. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1784-86.

167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), (2) (1982) (emphasis added).
168.

Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1786-90.
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the McDonald Douglas framework, since the result is conceptualized as an
affirmative defense rather than a partial shifting of the burden of
proof. 169
As for the standard of proof required, the Court saw no reason to
depart from the conventional rule of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. However, the Court offered some guidance in applying the
preponderance standard. Justice Brennan wrote that in most cases the
employer will be expected to include objective evidence as to the probable decision absent discrimination. 7 0 The standard requires the employer to prove what it would have done, as opposed to what it would have
been justified in doing.171
The O'Connor concurrence differs conceptually from the Brennan
opinion. Borrowing from tort analysis, Justice O'Connor employed an
evidentiary shifting of the burden, based on proof by plaintiff sufficient
to create an inference of causation. This conceptual difference allows
her to justify arguing for a limitation upon the holding. She wrote that a
plaintiff must show "direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion" in order to shift to the
72
defendant the burden of proof on "but-for" causation. 1
Justice White saw little point in this conceptual debate, though he
himself utilized language of a shifting burden rather than an affirmative
defense. He did not view the holding as a departure from McDonnell
Douglas, but instead a refinement recognizing the difference between
mixed motive cases and pretext cases. The three Justice dissent entered
the conceptual debate, arguing that the Brennan opinion's definition of
"because of" strips the phrase of all causal significance. Characterizing
the issue as one of burden shifting, Justice Kennedy argued that there is
no compelling reason to shift the burden, and that the increased complexity of the disparate treatment proof model will make the shifting
3
burden unworkable. 17
A word of caution regarding the dissent's characterization of the
holding is in order. The primary opinion, Justice Brennan writing for a
plurality, clearly held that a plaintiff need only prove that a protected
characteristic "played a motivating part in an employment decision" in
order to require a defendant to prove that "it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's [protected characteristic]
169. Patterson, handed downjust six weeks after Price Waterhouse, reaffirms the McDonnell

Douglas proof model, albeit in a § 1981 case. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S.
Ct. 2363, 2377-78 (1989). See supra Section C.

170. This holding [may be] a plurality position, as Justice White's concurrence specifically disagrees that there should be any special requirement of objective evidence by the
employer, Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1795-96, and Justice O'Connor's concurrence
does not set out her position on this issue. Justice Kennedy's dissent mischaracterizes the

court's holding. Id. at 1806.
171. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-88 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 1805. Again, Justice Kennedy mischaracterizes Justice O'Connor's position
as to the Court's holding. Id. at 1806-14.
173. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1806-14.
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into account."' 17 4 Only Justice O'Connor's concurrence would require
the plaintiff to prove, by "direct evidence," that the protected characteristic was a "substantial factor" in the decision in order to trigger the
75
defendant's burden to prove "but-for" causation.1
Justice White's concurrence adopts the Mt. Healthy standard, which
uses "motivating factor" and "substantial factor" interchangeably. His
opinion does not require "direct evidence" from either party, and requires the defendant to prove that the employment action would have
17 6
been taken anyway.
Combining the plurality and the two concurrences, the Court's
holding is as follows: A plaintiff need only prove that a protected characteristic played a substantial part or in other words, that it was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Upon such proof, which need
not be of any special variety, the defendant must then prove that it
would have made the same decision, even absent the discriminatory
reason.
However, the dissent characterizes the Court's holding differently.
Justice Kennedy writes that the Court held that "in a limited number of
cases," where a plaintiff presents "direct and substantial evidence," the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that the "decision
77
would have been supported by legitimate reasons."'
None of the controlling Price Waterhouse opinions require the defendant to prove merely that the decision would have been supported by
legitimate reasons. Rather, they require that the employer would have
made the same decision. 17 8 Further, Justice White's concurrence, the
key fifth vote, uses "motivating factor" and "substantial factor" interchangeably, adopting the Mt. Healthy language, and none of the
opinions in the combined majority mention "substantialevidence" (as opposed to "a substantial factor"). The dissent seems to have been reading a different set of opinions than those ultimately issued.
The majority's holding on the causation issue is clearly a middle
road. Price Waterhouse required the Court to decide (1) what causation
standard is required; (2) whether the analysis operates in the liability or
the damages phase of the case; (3) who bears the burden of proof; and
(4) by what standard of evidence causation must be proven. The Court
chose the pro-employer "but-for causation" standard, placed the analysis in the liability phase of the litigation (a pro-employer decision),
placed the burden of proof on the defendant (a pro-employee decision),
but chose the lower "preponderance" standard (a pro-employer decision). Although Price Waterhouse may be regarded as a strengthening of
the disparate treatment model, in a pro-employee sense, closer analysis
reveals the decision to be a delicate refinement and balancing of the
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at
at
at
at
Id.

1795.
1798.
1795.
1806.
at 1788.
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evidentiary burdens of the parties. The result is not so much a more
pro-employee model as a more viable model in that each party is effectively required to produce the evidence reasonably available to that
party in a coherent order.
Another aspect of Price Waterhouse is worthy of comment. The opinion removes any doubt about the legitimacy of a Title VII claim alleging
sex stereotyping. 17 9 Justice Brennan wrote:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group, for "in forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 180
treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes."'
Further, Price Waterhouse legitimates not only expert proof of sex stereotyping in the form of testimony by social psychologists,1 8 ' but also
"lay" proof. Justice Brennan wrote:
It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring "a
course at charm school." Nor ....

does it require expertise in

psychology to know that, if any employee's flawed "interpersonal skills" can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade
of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex18and
not her inter2
personal skills that has drawn the criticism.
E.

Disparate Impact. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio (statistical
proof and re-articulation of impact proof model)

The Supreme Court articulated the disparate impact proof model
primarily in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 183 and Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody. 184 While the individual disparate treatment model can be effective in proving discrimination against a relatively unsophisticated employer whose articulated motives are illicit, it fails to address the more
subtle but equally invidious discrimination which results from "artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers"' 85 "to full employment."' 8 6 These
barriers, though facially neutral, are discriminatory in effect. In order to
179. However, Justice Kennedy cautioned that the sex stereotyping still must have a
causal result in order to violate the statute. Id. at 1807.

180. Id. at 1791, citing to Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n. 13 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
181. While the Brennan opinion has no difficulty with expert testimony of sex stereotyping, at least where the employer's challenge is untimely, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. 1775, 1793 (1989), Justice O'Connor cautions that such testimony "standing
alone" would not constitute the "direct evidence" of "substantial reliance" which she
would require in order to shift the burden on causation. Id. at 1793.
182. Id. at 1793.
183. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
184. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
185. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
186. Holdeman, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust: The Changing Face of DisparateImpact, 66 DEN. U.L. REv. 179, 181 (1989).
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address such facially neutral employment practices in the Title VII context, the disparate impact proof model was adopted following fourteenth amendment precedents.' 8 7 The next thirteen years saw further
refinements in the application of the proof model, 18 8 but no retreat
from the basic principles of its operation. A disparate impact plaintiff
had to demonstrate that a particular employment device had a statistically adverse impact upon a protected group in marked disproportion to
its impact on employees outside that group.' 8 9 After the plaintiff established this primafacie case, the burden of persuasion (not merely the burden of production) shifted to the defendant to establish the business
necessity or manifest job relatedness of the challenged employment
practice.' 90
If the defendant proved the business necessity of the employment
practice, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate the existence of other
reasonable alternatives which would have less adverse impact on the
protected group. 191
In 1988, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,'19 2 a unanimous Court
extended disparate impact analysis to subjective employment decisionmaking. Disparate impact was clearly applicable to objective procedures
such as manual dexterity test and to objective criteria such as height,
education, or strength; but the circuits were divided as to whether disparate impact analysis could be applied in cases of subjectively measured
criteria such as professionalism, leadership, and congeniality, or cases of
subjective procedures such as interviews or evaluations, or cases in
which employment decisions were made arbitrarily without fixed criteria
or procedures. Watson brought such cases under the umbrella of the
disparate impact proof model. However, the newly forming conservative wing of the Court, in a plurality opinion, re-articulated this proof
model in terms which raised serious doubt about the continuing vitality
of the Griggs/Albenarle formulation. 193 In the 1989 case of Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 194 the Watson plurality was joined by Justice
Kennedy, enabling a new majority to restructure the disparate impact
proof model, dramatically increasing the difficulty of proving a disparate
impact claim.
187. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971);
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.,
1977).
188. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
189. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
190. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
191. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
192. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). Until Watson, the circuits had been divided as to whether
disparate impact analysis was applicable to subjective employment decision-making.
193. Holdeman, Watson v. Fort Worth BanA and Trust: The Changing Face of Disparate Impact, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 179 (1989).
194. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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1.

Facts

A group of former employees brought a class action suit against
Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. and Castle and Cooke Inc., owners and
operators of a number of Alaska salmon canneries and fish camps. The
complaint alleged that Wards Cove Packing Co. and Castle and Cooke
had discriminated on the basis of race in hiring, firing, paying, promoting, housing and messing (providing food) at their Alaska canneries.
Salmon canning is a seasonal enterprise coinciding with the summer
salmon run. Most of the canneries are located in remote areas of Alaska,
and consequently the canning companies transport most employees to
the canneries, feed and house them there, and transport them from the
canneries when their work is completed.
There are two general categories of jobs: cannery worker-labor
jobs and non-cannery jobs. The non-cannery employees are hired in the
Seattle area in the early spring and are sent to the canneries in
preseason (late April or May) to dewinterize, repair and prepare the facilities for the salmon run. They also stay after the canning season ends
to winterize and shut down the facilities.
Non-cannery jobs include carpenters, machinists and other skilled
trades, but also include some unskilled positions. At the canneries operated by the defendants, these employees are mostly white, and they are
paid from two to three times as much as cannery workers. Most noncannery jobs are filled by word-of-mouth recruitment. The mostly white
supervisors have virtually complete discretion in making hiring decisions. There is no advertising or posting of job openings. Rehire preference is given to former non-cannery employees, but not to cannery
employees, for non-cannery jobs. Many non-cannery employees are related to other non-cannery employees.
Cannery employees are hired later in the spring and are employed
only during the season, which lasts from three weeks to two months.
Most are hired either from Alaska Native villages or through a largely
Filipino local of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union ("ILWU Local 37"). Most cannery workers are non-white,
largely of Filipino, Alaska Native, Japanese or Chinese descent. Rehire
preference is given to cannery employees for cannery jobs, and many
cannery employees are related to other cannery employees.
Non-cannery workers arrive at the cannery sites approximately one
month earlier and stay one month later than the cannery workers. They
are assigned to the smaller, nicer and better insulated bunk houses. As
the cannery workers arrive, the remaining large bunkhouses are opened
and the cannery workers are housed there. Since almost all non-cannery
workers are white, housing is almost entirely racially separate. Bunk
houses are often identified by racial labels such as the "Eskimo
quarters" or "the Filipino house."
Each cannery has two mess halls, one identifiably white and the
other identifiably non-white. The union contract with Local 37 provides
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for a separate cooking crew for Local 37 workers. The mess halls are
often designated as "the Filipino mess house" and "the White mess
house."
Other racial labeling is also common. The salmon butchering
machine is called the "chink" and the operator is "the chink man." Cannery workers are referred to as "Eskimo labor" or "the Filipino crew";
cannery worker sign-on pay as "Filipino sign-on pay"; certain employee
badge numbers are reserved for "Filipinos" and others for "Natives";
laundry bags and mail slots are marked with designations like "Oriental
Bunkhouse."
The plaintiffs alleged that all of the these employment practices discriminate on the basis of race in violation of Title VII. The complaint
alleges that 1) the employers intentionally discriminated (the disparate
treatment proof model), and that 2) even if there was no intent to discriminate, these employment practices nonetheless had an adverse impact on minorities and were not necessary to the employer's business
(the disparate impact proof model).
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the employers on several grounds, including a holding that the disparate impact proof model
195
is not applicable to subjective employment practices.
The employees appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which ultimately reversed the trial court's decision. The full
court held that disparate impact analysis should have been applied to all
of the challenged employment practices. 19 6 In a second opinion, the
court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions as to how the
disparate impact analysis should apply. 19 7 The employers appealed to
the Supreme Court, which granted certiorarito hear the case.
While the plaintiffs claimed discrimination in pay, promotion, housing and messing, these disparities stemmed directly from the fact that
most employees hired for non-cannery jobs were white and most hired
for cannery jobs were minorities. At the heart of the case, then, is the
claim that the defendants' hiring practices had a disparate effect on
minorities.
2.

Statistics

The statistical component of a disparate impact case is the vehicle
for proving the degree of impact caused by the employer's practice.1 9 8
195. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,821 (W.D. Wa.

1982).
196. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 810 F.2d 1477.
197. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 827 F.2d 439.
198. In order to establish a primafacie case, the disparity of impact must be substantial.
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures provide a suggested benchmark of eighty percent. A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than 4/5 of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the
federal enforcement agencies as evidence of disparate impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1988).
While the "80% rule" is not a strict formula for determining disparate impact, it is a
benchmark of prosecutorial discretion, Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421
(9th Cir. 1985); and, as part of the Uniform Guidelines, is entitled to great deference by
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In other words, the purpose of the statistical comparison is to isolate
and measure the effect of the employer's practice from the effect of all
other possible causes for the imbalance. Thus, the preferred statistical
comparison is between the racial composition of employees in at-issue
jobs and the racial composition of the qualified relevant labor market.19 9
For most at-issue jobs, this comparison effectively eliminates other possible causes for the impact, such as a dearth of qualified applicants.
If there are no barriers or practices deterring qualified minorities
from applying for at-issue jobs, a court may properly compare the racial
composition of those hired with those who applied.2 0 0 If such statistics
are difficult or impossible to obtain, or if barriers have skewed the applicant flow, other reasonably reliable statistical comparisons (a surrogate
20
pool) may also be probative. '
In Wards Cove, plaintiffs offered neither applicant flow statistics nor
labor market statistics. Instead plaintiffs rested their statistical case almost entirely upon an internal comparison of the employer's work force.
Simply put, plaintiffs demonstrated that most of the cannery workers
were minorities and that most of the non-cannery workers were white,
and argued that the packing companies' hiring and promotion policies
either caused or perpetuated this racial stratification in the work force
without a business justification.
Presumably, the Wards Cove plaintiffs were unable to gather either
relevant labor market statistics or applicant flow statistics. Though the
Wards Cove opinions and trial record did not shed light on the plaintiffs'
trial strategies, one may surmise that applicant flow statistics were unavailable because of the highly informal, geographically segmented, and
substantially undocumented hiring procedure used by the employers.
Even if plaintiffs could have gathered statistics measuring expressions of
job interest, such statistics could not measure the effects of challenged
employment practices such as failure to post job openings, separate and
geographically diverse hiring channels, and the chilling effect on poten20 2
tial applicants of the existing racial stratification in the workforce.
These factors would operate to skew the applicant flow.
Relevant labor market statistics would seem to have been more feathe courts. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975). Statistical compari-

sons must be valid in terms of significance (based on a sample large enough to yield reliable results), Kim v. Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 772 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1985); Soria v. Ozinga Bros. Inc., 704 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1983); Harper v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975); scope (covering the appropriate category of
employees), Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 482 (9th Cir. 1983); Kirk-

land v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2nd Cir. 1975); and
time (covering appropriate length of time), Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, 720 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir. 1983); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976); Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4, 1607.15 A(2) (1988).
199. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
200. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2119, 2120-21 (1989); See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977).
201. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977) (allowing use of national general population statistics).

202. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 365-66.
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sible to obtain than applicant flow statistics, but undoubtedly there
would be significant difficulties there, too. The skills required for the atissue jobs were diverse, ranging from medical personnel to machinists
and from carpenters to clerical workers. 20 3 The relevant labor market
included the entire northwestern United States rather than one geographically restricted area within normal commuting distance, as would
be customary for jobs not requiring residence at the job site. Perhaps
most importantly, the relevant labor market would include only those
willing to undertake a seasonal position requiring several months away
from home, living in primitive conditions.
Presumably because of these difficulties, plaintiffs used what was, in
effect, a surrogate pool. That is, they used the pool of cannery workers
as a surrogate for the pool of qualified applicants or the relevant labor
market.
Not surprisingly and not unreasonably, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' statistical comparison. Writing for the majority, Justice White
observed that a racially imbalanced workforce, without more, does not
constitute a violation of Title VII, nor does it constitute evidence of a
statutory violation. Absent improper limitation on the applicant flow,
such statistics, according to the majority, are "irrelevant to the question
of a prima facie statistical case of disparate impact." To hold otherwise,
observed Justice White, "would almost inexorably lead to the use of numerical quotas in the workplace ...."204
The majority found a number of problems with the use of these
workforce statistics. First, most of the at-issue jobs (non-cannery jobs)
were skilled positions. Non-cannery positions included such jobs as
carpenters, machinists of several varieties, crane operators, institutional
cooks, pipe fitters, clerical workers, medical personnel, and radio operators. The plaintiffs failed to show that any significant percentage of the
cannery workers possessed any of these skills. Without evidence establishing that cannery workers were qualified for non-cannery jobs, the
plaintiffs' statistics cannot separate the effect of the hiring procedure
from the effect of a lack of qualified minorities. 20 5 Thus, with regard to
the skilled non-cannery positions, the workforce statistics failed to establish a pool of qualified applicants.
Second, for skilled and unskilled positions alike, the majority found
additional flaws in the use of cannery workers as a surrogate pool. Justice White wrote that the use of cannery workers was an analysis "at
once both too broad and too narrow in its focus." Since plaintiffs had
made no showing of how many cannery workers would seek non-cannery positions, he found the pool too broad. Since the district court had
found that non-whites were overrepresented in cannery positions, as
compared with the relevant labor market, he found the pool too
203.
33,835
204.
205.

Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,821, 33,833(W.D. Wa. 1982).
Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2123.
Id.

1990]

CIVIL RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT

narrow. 2 06
The dissenting Justices did little to effectively attack the majority's
statistical approach. Agreeing that the ideal statistical analysis should
compare the racial composition of at-issue jobs with the racial composition of the relevant labor market, Justice Stevens argued that the district
court had made insufficient findings regarding the nature of the relevant
labor market, especially for non-cannery jobs, that the court had made
no findings regarding the extent to which cannery workers possessed
non-cannery job skills, despite "persuasive" testimony, from individual
plaintiffs; and that the labor market statistics offered by the employers
were deficient in that they did not identify workers willing to accept seasonal work. The dissent implies agreement with the majority that racial
stratification of the workforce does not establish a prima facie case, but
argues that the stratification should be treated as significant evidence in
20 7
a primafacie case.
Conceptually, the majority is correct. If the purpose of statistical
proof is to isolate and measure the effect of a challenged employment
practice, an internal analysis of the employer's workforce, without more,
measures little. Only in the unusual employment setting of totally internal hiring would such workforce statistics measure the effects of the hiring procedure, and then only if virtually all lower level employees were
both qualified for and desirous of the at-issue jobs.
The Court was therefore correct in finding the statistical analysis
presented by the Wards Cove plaintiffs to be insufficient to establish a
primafacie case. This is not to say, however, that the Court's articulation
of standards for statistical proof is entirely satisfactory. Despite the almost self-evident fact that hiring processes such as those used in Wards
Cove have a disparate impact by perpetuating racial stratification in the
work force, the degree of precision of statistical analysis required by the
Court may well have placed these practices beyond attack, at least in the
"unique" case 2 0 8 of intense, seasonal employment. A plaintiff cannot
rely on applicant statistics because the very hiring practices challenged
prevent the gathering of accurate applicant statistics by both deterring
potential non-white applicants and by failing to document job inquiries.
A plaintiff will be hard pressed to rely on qualified labor market statistics
because the skills required for upper tier jobs are too diverse to tailor
the pool, and because it is often difficult to identify and exclude those
unwilling to accept seasonal employment away from home.
The only remaining option is the use of a surrogate pool, and the
most obvious possibility for use as a surrogate is the employer's own
lower level work force. The Wards Cove decision would allow a plaintiff
to use work force statistics, in such a case, provided that the plaintiff
carefully tailor that pool to reflect only workers qualified for upper level
jobs. However, the majority went on to impose unrealistically strict evi206. Id.
207. Id. at 2127.
208. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dentiary standards, requiring direct proof of even the most obvious
components of the analysis. For instance, in Wards Cove, non-cannery
positions often paid three to four times as much as cannery positions for
a season only about a month longer. 20 9 Non-cannery positions entitled
the employee to heated bunkhouses, and more comfortable accommodations. Yet the majority was unwilling to infer that most cannery workers would prefer non-cannery jobs, objecting instead that the plaintiffs
had not proven how many cannery workers would seek non-canneryjobs
absent the challenged practices.
The majority's objection to the plaintiffs' evidence on this point is
another occasion upon which the Court has implicitly rejected normal
circumstantial evidence and instead required direct evidence. By applying a requirement of direct evidence sub silentio, the majority is able to
avoid the necessity of justifying its rejection of standard evidentiary
principles. In 1989, we are clearly a long way from the time (1976) when
a nearly unanimous Court held that:
Measured against these standards, the company's assertion that
a person who has not actually applied for a job can never be
awarded seniority relief cannot prevail. The effects of and the
injuries suffered from discriminatory employment practices are
not always confined to those who were expressly denied a requested employment opportunity. A consistently enforced
discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from
those who are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain rejection. If an
employer should announce his policy of discrimination by a
sign reading "Whites Only" on the hiring-office door, his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the sign and
subjected themselves to personal rebuffs. The same message
can be communicated to potential applicants more subtly but
just as clearly by an employer's actual practices - by his consistent discriminatory treatment of actual applicants, by the manner in which he publicizes vacancies, his recruitment
techniques, his responses to casual or tentative inquiries, and
even by the racial or ethnic composition of that part of his work
force from which he has discriminatorily excluded members of
minority groups. When a person's desire for a job is not translated into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of
goes through the motions of subdiscrimination as is he 2who
10
mitting an application.
Finally, the majority's strict statistical proof requirements are problematic because here, as often, the quality of statistical evidence available to the disparate impact plaintiff is almost entirely within the control
of the employer. The more informal, subjective, and undocumented the
employment procedure, the less likely the plaintiff will be able to compile the statistics necessary to challenge the discriminatory effect of the
209. See Plaintiff's Brief at 5.
210. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-66 (1977).
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employer's arbitrary practices. The problem is obvious. The proof requirements encourage the very conduct which is so often a cloak for
impermissible discrimination. The majority discouhts this problem by
pointing out that employers subject to the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures 2 1 ' ("Guidelines") are required to maintain
212
records sufficient to calculate the impact of employment practices.
Yet seasonal employers like the Wards Cove defendants are exempted
from the Guidelines' recordkeeping requirements. 2 13 Even for covered
employers, the recordkeeping requirements carry no meaningful sanctions and are notoriously unenforced. In the face of the obvious incentives to keep incomplete records, the Court's citation to the Guidelines
is little more than a convenient choice to avoid having to justify the results of the evidentiary standards now imposed.
3.

Identification

After discussing the issue of statistical proof, the majority went on
to clarify other parts of the impact proof model left uncertain by last
term's plurality decision in Watson. 2 14 Under the pre-Watson proof
model, a plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the challenged employment practice had a disparate impact on a protected group. Implicit
in this prima facie case was a requirement that the plaintiff identify the
offending employment practice. However, the degree of specificity required for such identification had never been directly addressed by the
Court, and the degree of specificity can easily be outcome determinative.
Consider a multi-component hiring procedure which combines a
degree requirement, a check of references, a preference for three years
of relevant experience, and an interview. The interviews are conducted
by a single decision-maker who subjectively assesses the applicant using
a list of criteria such as ability to relate well with others, communication
skills, appearance, leadership skills and attitude. After completing the
process, the decision-maker makes an intuitive decision from among the
applicants with the required degree, based upon the responses of references, the interview, and the nature of the applicant's prior experience.
This procedure results in almost exclusively hiring of white males to the
virtual exclusion of other people. How specifically must a plaintiff identify the offending practice or employment qualification in order to successfully challenge this hiring procedure? A plaintiff would be able to
assess the impact of the degree requirement. Since it operates essentially as a screening device, its impact will be clearly traceable. This is
precisely the kind of identification requirement which the Supreme
Court has implicitly applied in its earlier disparate impact decisions, For
instance, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,215 the challenged practice was a
211. 29CFR § 1607.1 (1988).
212. See 29 CFR § 1607.4(A) and (C).
213. 29 CFR § 1602.14(b) (1988).
214. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). See Holdeman, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, The
Changing Face of Disparate Impact, 66 DEN. U. L. REV. 179 (1989).
215. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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requirement of a high school degree or a passing test score. In Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 2 16 the challenged practice was a pre-employment
test. In Dothardv. Rawlinson,2 17 the challenged practice was a height and
weight requirement. In New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,2 18 the challenged practice was the automatic exclusion of all applicants who were
methadone users. In Connecticut v. Teal,2 19 the challenged practice was a
pre-promotion screening examination.
But identification becomes a thornier issue when a plaintiff challenges the impact of either subjective criteria used for employee selection, or subjective procedures (methods) for employee selection. In Wards
Cove, the plaintiffs had challenged several objective employment practices (word-of-mouth hiring, separate hiring channels, nepotism, re-hire
preferences) and the practice of subjective decision-making. The Court
held that, in such a case, the plaintiff must:
..demonstrate that the disparity they complain of is the result

of one or more of the employment practices that they are attacking here, specifically showing that each challenged practice
has a significantly disparate impact
on employment opportuni2 20
ties for whites and nonwhites.
The dissenting Justices address this identification requirement only
briefly, by pointing out that traditional tort causation concepts do not
require that the offending act be the sole or even the primary cause of
the harm. 2 2 1 The import of the identification holding is potentially
enormous. The majority opinion may well be read (as the dissent understood it) to require the Wards Cove plaintiffs not only to measure the
combined impact of the challenged practices - a task difficult enough
- but to separate the impact of each component from the others. Apparently, the only characteristics of an employment procedure which
may be successfully challenged are those which, operating in a vacuum,
would have an individual impact level sufficiently egregious to establish
disparate impact.
It is anomalous indeed that an employer may not significantly impact a protected group by using a single-component employment device, but that same employer may permissibly accomplish an even
greater adverse impact against a protected group by combining the impact of several components. The majority does not even attempt to justify this result, either conceptually or practically.
Further, the evidentiary difficulties of such a task are staggering for
the plaintiff. Rare will be the employment practice for which the statistical effect of each component can be isolated and separately measured.
Even a personnel specialist with strong incentives would find it a chal216. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
217. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
218. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
219. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
220. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125 (1989).
221. Id. at 2132, citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-33 (1965) and Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
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lenging task to create a procedure with individual components, each of
which would have a separately measurable impact level after the components had been used in combination and simultaneously. However, the
Wards Cove holding gives employers every incentive to select systems
which do not document or memorialize the discrete impact of each aspect of the decision-making process. 22 2 Certainly a prophylactic policy
of not keeping records will be far easier than using quotas and therefore,
a far more real danger. 2 23 This is particularly true since quotas would
buy protection from disparate impact challenges only at a high price significant loss of employer autonomy - whereas use of untrackable systems will maximize the kind of employer autonomy which has often
served as a mask for discrimination.
There will be other battlegrounds in addition to the proof
problems, perhaps the largest of which will be semantic. The Court has
never defined the various terms often used interchangeably to refer to
employment actions challengeable by impact analysis: employment
practices, devices, procedures, components, systems, criteria. The
Wards Cove requirement speaks primarily in terms of specific employment "practices". 224 It is not difficult to imagine the semantic battles
which will accompany the identification requirement, as plaintiffs identify a certain employment "practice" and defendants seek to divide the
employment action into a group of "practices."
The Wards Cove majority seeks to justify the requirement of isolating
each component "practice" by reliance on Connecticut v. Teal, 22 5 but the
Court misremembers the theoretical underpinnings of the Teal holding.
In Teal, the defendant had used a pre-promotion screening test which
had a disparate impact upon minorities. The defendant had compensated for the disparate impact of the test by manipulating the second
step of the promotion process. The Teal holding focused upon the
rights of individual applicants for promotion. The Court held that to
allow a second stage in the selection process to cure the disparate impact of the first stage "ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees (the
applicants at the first stage] the opportunity to compete equally with
white workers ....,226
The Teal rationale does not support the proposition that employment actions must be analyzed in subcategories. Indeed, the Teal emphasis on individual applicants would support the opposite result.
Under Teal, the key is equality of opportunity, at each stage of the deci222. In fact, it has been cogently argued that Wards Cove not only negates the employers need to validate their employment criteria but actually discourages them from doing so

as such validation procedures could only serve to build the case against the employer. C.
Craver, Employment Practices, 364 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 4 (July 17, 1989).
223. See, Holdeman, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, The Changing Face of Disparate
Impact, 66 DEN U.L. REV. 179, 190-192 (1989).
224. 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
225. 457 U.S. at 450.
226. Id. at 451.
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sion-making process. It by no means legitimates multi-component systems which work cumulatively to deny such equality of opportunity.
4.

Business Justification

Once a plaintiff had established that the challenged practice had a
disparate impact, the pre-Watson proof model required the employer to
shoulder the burden of persuasion (not merely production) to establish
that the challenged practice was a business necessity or manifestly job
related. 22 7 The Watson plurality raised doubt as to whether the Court
22 8
intended to maintain this burden allocation.
In one paragraph, the Wards Cove majority dispenses with the requirement that the employer shoulder the burden of proof on business
justification. justice White made no attempt to justify the break with
precedent. He pointed out that plaintiffs generally bear the burden of
proof, citing Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 301, and that disparate
treatment plaintiffs bear burden of proof at each stage. Then he wrote:
We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read
as suggesting otherwise .... But to the extent that those cases

speak of an employer's "burden of proof" with respect to a
legitimate business justification defense ....

they should have

been understood to mean an employer's production - but not
9
persuasion

-

burden.

22

In the same section the majority significantly lowered the level of
business need necessary to justify the use of an employment practice
with a disparate impact. The Court did not justify the change, nor even
admit that its holding constituted a break with precedent. Dispensing
with the requirement that the challenged practice be justified by "manifest job relatedness" or "business necessity," Justice White wrote:
Though we have phrased the query differently in different
cases, it is generally well-established that at the justification
stage of a disparate impact case, the dispositive issue is whether
a challenged practice serves, in a significant
way, the legitimate
23 0
employment goals of the employer.
Justice White framed the inquiry as a middle ground between a "mere
insubstantial justification" and an "indispensable" practice. The dissenting Justices pointed out the new standard, Justice Stevens writing,
"I am astonished to read" the majority's "casual - almost summary rejection of the statutory construction that developed in the wake of
3..
Griggs.. ,11
Certainly the shifting of the burden of proof on justification back to
the plaintiff, and the simultaneous increase in the standard to be proven
will have a significant effect. Even if shifting the burden of proof only
227. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
228. See Holdeman, supra note 221, at 194-196.
229. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
230.

Id.'at 2125.

231.

Id. at 2131.
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makes a difference in close cases, that difference is significant. 23 2 But
that is not the only significance. The pre-Watson allocation was useful,
not only in that it placed the burden of proof on the party who had the
ability to gather and maintain the evidence, but also because it was consonant with the public policy of eradicating racial and sexual stratification in employment. If such a policy is a national priority, then once it
has been established that an employment practice has a discriminatory
effect, it is reasonable to require the employer to prove that the practice
is justified. The former rule also relieved plaintiffs of the rather awkward task of proving a negative, i.e., that the practice is not justified.
5.

Alternative Practices

Finally, the majority discussed the third stage of the impact proof
model. In stage three, an employment practice which has a disparate
impact, but which is sufficiently justified, may still be unlawful if "other
[practices] without a similarly undesirable racial effect would also serve
2 33
the employer's legitimate interest.
After quoting the well-worn language from Albemarle, Justice White
rather casually added that:
[o]f course, any alternative practices which respondents offer
up in this respect must be equally effective as petitioners' chosen
hiring procedures in achieving petitioners' legitimate employment goals. Moreover, "[flactors such as the cost or other burdens
of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged
practice in serving the employer's legitimate business goals."
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988)
(O'Connor, J.). "Courts are generally less competent than employers to
restructure business practices," Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); consequently, the judiciary
should proceed with care before mandating that an employer
must adopt a plaintiff's alternate selection or hiring practice
"234

This articulation of stage three is small comfort to a plaintiff who has
met the Court's strict standards for statistical evidence and specific identification in stage one, but who has failed to prove the lack of business
justification in stage two. A stage three plaintiff must prove (1) that the
alternative device would have had less adverse impact, and (2) that it
would have served the employer equally well.
Proof of the impact level of the alternative device often will be impossible. Assessment of the impact of a device actually used is difficult
enough. Proof of the impact level of a hypothetical device will be even
more difficult. Even if a plaintiff can establish that the impact level of
232. See Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.

Ct. 1775, 1800 (1989).
233. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).

234. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2127 (1989) (emphasis
added).
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the alternative device would be substantially less disparate, the requirement that the proposed device must serve the employer equally well will
often be impossible. This is particularly true since Justice White's language seems to almost create a presumption in favor of the employer
who is more "competent" in these matters.
The effect of the majority's interpretation of stage three is to elevate
the most trivial business interest of the employer above the plaintiff's
and society's interests in equal employment opportunity. This shifting
of the weight afforded to these competing socio-economic interests belies any claim that equal employment opportunity is still a strong or
even a viable public policy.
III.

THE NEW GENERATION -

REAGAN'S LEGACY.

There are two major ideological principles at work in the 1989
term. First, the opinions clearly signal a shift in the balance between the
interests of disadvantaged groups, employers, and advantaged groups.
With Title VII's enactment, Congress declared that the eradication
of employment discrimination was to be considered a national policy of
the highest priority.2

35

In the first quarter century the Court gave

meaning to that declaration by its willingness to place a judicial thumb
on the scales in favor of disadvantaged groups, when doing so would
encourage or assist Title VII plaintiffs to fulfill their role as private attorneys general.
The very creation of the two primary proof models are examples.
The disparate impact proof model, freeing the plaintiff from the tether
of intent, 23 6 was a major step. 2 3 7 The disparate treatment proof model,
though still requiring proof of intent, eased the burden by requiring the
employer to first articulate its non-discriminatory reasons. 238 The adoption of a presumptive fee award to prevailing plaintiffs23 9 but not to prevailing defendants 240 is another example of the Court's recognition of
the social policy.
Title VII's second quarter century, however, sees a Court unwilling
235. See S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. i, at 11, 24 (1964); H.R. REP. No.
914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 1-2 (1963).
236. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
237. Some argue that it was a step far beyond Title VII and the congressional intent
which enacted it. See Gold, "Grigg's An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse
Impact Definition and a Recommendation for Reform," 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985).
238. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). But see Furnish, "Formalistic Solutions to Complex
Problems: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII," 6 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 353 (1984).
239. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (a prevailing
plaintiff should "ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust").
240. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (fee award to
prevailing defendant only upon showing "that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation").
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to tip the balance of competing interests in favor of women and minorities; willing instead to elevate the interests of employers and advantaged
employees at the expense of plaintiffs' interests.
Perhaps the most dramatic shift is the elevation of the interests of
advantaged groups. City of Richmond'S 24 1 adoption of strict scrutiny review for voluntary state and local government affirmative action by state
and local government renders such governmental initiatives all but a
dead letter, and the future of all affirmative action is shrouded.
The implicit conceptual underpinnings of this holding reveal a dramatic reversal of national policy. Strict scrutiny was historically applied
to racial classifications which disadvantage minorities primarily because
of the magnitude of the damage done by slavery and by the powerful
vestiges of slavery which have operated to deprive minority citizens of
full participation in American society. Racial classification was subjected
to strict scrutiny because it was historically invidious, unjust, and oppressive - a tool to perpetuate the legacy of slavery. The decision to
apply strict scrutiny to remedial racial classification implicitly regards
the past twenty-five years of affirmative action as similarly invidious and
effectively equates the efforts of states to achieve racial equality with Jim
Crow laws.
The theme is continued in Martin v. Wilks. The majority opinion
agreed that identification of persons appropriate forjoinder will be difficult for plaintiffs, but responded that those difficulties "arise from the
nature of the relief sought."'2 4 2 The majority expressly intended that
affirmative relief be difficult to secure.
The Martin dissent by Justice Stevens points out that the majority
mischaracterized the holding of the lower court, and therefore sidestepped the real issue of whether a court ordered plan is a defense to a
subsequent claim of intentional discrimination. Justice Stevens pointed
out that the district court did not hold that the white fire fighters were
bound by the prior decree, but rather that race-conscious promotions
made because they are required by a court order are not made with the
requisite discriminatory intent.2

43

The majority simply conceptualized

the question in a way which insured the answer it desired.
Even if this sleight-of-hand was not an intentional device, the consequences of the Martin holding cannot have evaded the Court. In the
face of the contrary holdings of the great majority of the federal courts
of appeals,2 44 the majority opened to attack thousands of decrees entered during the past twenty-five years. The gravity of this action is
manifest. 24 5 Nor can it realistically be considered a coincidence that
241. City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
242. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2187 (1989).
243. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2193 n.15.
244. Id. at 2185 n.3.
245. The Martin holding also comes at the expense of employers' significant interests
in avoiding re-litigation of remedial decrees, particularly given the inevitable uncertainty
as to what evidence would be relevant and what the proof standards would be when relitigating a remedy imposed years before.
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Martin was issued together with Lorance v. A T&T, 24 6 in which the Court
protected from challenge all facially neutral seniority systems more than
180 days old, no matter how seriously they impact individuals who have
no other opportunity to challenge the discriminatory system. While
there are policy reasons for treating seniority systems differently from
other Title VII violations, 24 7 the juxtaposition of these two opinions remains a none too subtle clue to this Court's agenda.
However, if there were any doubt, the elevation of the interests of
2 48
nonminority employees is explicitly set out by Justice Scalia in Zipes.
He wrote:
While innocent interveners raising non-Title VII claims are
not, like Title VII plaintiffs, "the chosen instrument[s] of congress," [citation omitted] neither are they disfavored participants in Title VII proceedings. An intervenor of the sort
before us here is particularlywelcome, since we have stressed the
necessity of protecting, in Title VII litigation, "the legitimate
expectations
.
2 49
wrongdoing,"

.

.

of

employees

innocent

of

any

In the footnote referencing this assertion, Justice Scalia directly pinpointed the difference between the two approaches. He observed that
the dissent had favored the interests of prevailing plaintiffs, and that the
majority rejects this "judge-made ranking of rights." '2 50 Despite Justice
Scalia's nod to the special role of Title VII plaintiffs as "chosen instruments," Zipes substantially insulates non-minority employees from attorneys' fee liability on the theory that such intervenors were protecting
their own "rights" and "legitimate expectations," although the attorneys' fee issue can arise only after ajudicial determination that the intervenors did not have such rights and their expectations were not
legitimate. Zipes elevated even the colorable, but invalid claims of nonminority litigants above the social policy of Title VII enforcement articu25
lated in ChristiansburgGarment Co.

1

While the elevation of the rights of non-minority employees may be
the most dramatic change in the new approach, plaintiffs do not fare
well against employers either. Wards Cove Packing2 52 is the clearest example. The icy tone of Justice White's opinion carries no apology or
2 53
of
regret that whatJustice Blackmun called the "plantation economy"
the packing industry is placed beyond challenge. It contains no hint that
246.

Lorance v. A.T. & T. Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).

247. Congress intended to protect vested competitive seniority rights of employees,
even if the seniority system perpetuated the effects of the employer's prior discrimination.
The loss by innocent employees ofjob benefits long earned and relied upon was too high a
cost. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352-354 (1977).
248. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
249. Id. at 2737-38 (emphasis added) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 372 (1977)).
250. Id. 2737-38 n4.
251. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
252. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
253. Id. at 2136.

1990]

CIVIL RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT

any Title VII principle could require the packing company to so much as
post a notice that non-cannery hiring is about to commence.
Instead, by requiring separate analysis of each challenged employment practice, the majority adopted a statistical standard impossible for
plaintiffs to meet. As if that were not enough, the Court modified the
traditional impact proof model to shift the burden of proof on business
justification to the plaintiff.
The most direct evidence of the majority's elevation of employer's
rights is the significant change in the standard of business justification.
In effect, the Wards Cove majority held that an employment practice
which has a grossly disparate impact upon minorities is justified by a de
minimis difference in cost, convenience, or efficiency, notwithstanding
the availability of substantially adequate non-discriminatory alternatives.
This holding elevates any interest of the employer, regardless of its
weight or the degree to which it is impaired, above the plaintiff's interests in equal employment opportunity. It precludes any sort of balancing of needs or interests. Justice Scalia's rhetoric to the contrary, this
holding reflects nothing less than the majority's own "judge-made rank2 54
ing of rights."
Another significant indication of the Court's elevation of employers'
interests at the expense of plaintiffs is implicit in Zipes. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion fashioned an approach which would protect
nonfrivolous intervenors from fee awards by placing fee liability on the
Title VII wrongdoer whose discrimination had necessitated the remedy.
However the majority opinion does not even address that approach as
an option. While discussing the competing interests of the two sets of
employees (the plaintiffs and the intervenors), the majority simply assumes that the fee liability of the employer extends only to the expenses
caused by the employer's defense but does not extend to fees caused by
the employer's underlying violation of Title VII. This despite the fact
that continued liability for plaintiff's attorneys fees would discourage
employers from bargaining with plaintiffs by sacrificing the legitimate
rights of other employees (a conceptual underpinning of the majority's
opinion), and thus would serve the interest of both plaintiffs and
intervenors.
It can be no coincidence that, in seven out of the eight major employment cases, the interests of the employers and/or non-minority employees were protected at the expense of plaintiffs' interests. The new
majority has rejected the Court's role in effectuating the congressional
policy underlying Title VII's enactment. No longer will the interests of
minority and women employees receive special consideration from the
Court, and in some instances, the interests of employers and non-minority employees will be elevated far above those of minority employees.
The second major ideological principle at work in the 1989 term is a
254. Id. at 2138.
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strong antipathy for systemic remedies as opposed to individual
remedies.
Witness first the adoption of the strict scrutiny standard for state
and local governments' remedial schemes in City of Richmond. The
nearly impossible statistical proof standards required to justify a raceconscious plan insure that few such plans will survive - clearly the
Court's intention.
Nor do system-wide challenges to private employment practices
fare better. In Wards Cove, the Court used the same method - impossibly high statistical proof requirements - to effectively curtail multicomponent challenges, and significantly toughened the proof model for
all disparate impact cases.
The relationship between the disparate impact proof model and systemic remedies is both theoretical and practical. Although seldom articulated so directly, one of the ideological underpinnings of the
disparate impact model is the notion that employers ought to do what
they reasonably can do in order to improve employment opportunities
for disadvantaged groups. Thus, employers were not to use employment practices which had a disparate impact unless those practices were
really necessary. While usually unspoken, the converse was also true.
The advantages to avoiding a disparate impact challenge altogether operated to encourage employers to utilize employment practices which
would insure at least a minimal degree of employment opportunity for
minorities and women. So, conceptually, the disparate impact proof
model implements significant elements of the affirmative action
principle.
Even absent this conceptual similarity, the effects of disparate impact prevention and remedies are systemic in nature. Prevention usually
requires work force analysis, statistical studies of particular employment
practices, and affirmative efforts to increase minority participation.
Remedies for disparate impact usually require additional affirmative
measures. So the Court's rather transparent intention to make the disparate impact model less viable is further evidence of the increasing disfavor of systemic remedies for discrimination.
The holdings in Martin and Zipes, resulting as they will in the challenge to and possible dismantling of large numbers of functioning remedial decrees, are two more pieces in the puzzle. Juxtaposed against the
severe time limitations placed upon challenges to seniority systems by
Lorance, it is clear that both systemic challenges and remedies are targets
in these three cases as well.
Additionally, it is noteworthy that, of eight cases, the only successful
minority or woman plaintiff was the disparate treatment plaintiff. Price
Waterhouse was the only occasion on which the Court protected the plaintiff's interests over those of the employer, but it was a major ruling without which the disparate treatment model could have been vitiated.
Finally, the Courts' substantial re-emphasis on the concept of intent
is key to the shutting down of systemic remedies. Wards Cove, and its
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predecessor Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, signal a conceptual return to "intent" in the context of the disparate impact proof model. 2 55
City of Richmond spoke of "individual victims" and a "prima facie case"
against individuals in the construction industry. Lorance and Betts both
focused on proving actual intent to discriminate by enactment of a seniority or benefit system, and Betts elevated proof of intent to part of the
prima facie case.
Price Waterhouse and City of Richmond remind us that the conservative
Justices have their differences. Justices O'Connor and White were the
swing votes in Price Waterhouse, reflecting some reason for optimism for
individual disparate treatment plaintiffs seeking individual remedies.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy wrote concurring opinions significantly to
the right of the majority holding in City of Richmond, boding ill for future
affirmative action plans to come before the Court - plans raising issues
beyond the limited scope of voluntary remedial plans by state and local
governments.
Despite these differences, however, the consensus is transparent.
Absent a strong congressional response to the 1988 term, the Court is
likely to continue the course which it has charted by the conceptual
framework of its recent holdings. The Court will pay careful attention to
the interests of non-minorities and employers, rejecting the principle
that the strong national policy underlying the Civil Rights Act of 1964
requires a construction of Title VII which makes it a forceful tool for
societal change. The Court will continue to close down opportunities
for systemic remedies, whether aimed at discrimination by a particular
employer, or a particular industry, or at historic societal discrimination.
The Court may not admit these agenda items, but instead may take
the sorts of opportunities selected for the 1989 term: the manipulation
of burdens of proof and issues of causation (City of Richmond, Wards Cove
Packing, and Price Waterhouse); the creation of nearly impossible statistical
and other evidentiary requirements (City of Richmond and Wards Cove);
technical construction of statutory language (Martin, Patterson and
Lorance); and the continuing emphasis on and construction of the concept of intent (Wards Cove Packing, City of Richmond, Martin, and Lorance).
The Court may sometimes claim to reaffirm the goals of ending discrimination and the importance of the viability of Title VII but will construct and justify its adverse holdings by the same sorts of devices it used
in the 1988 and 1989 terms. The Court will give with one hand but take
away with the other. 2 56 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust purportedly
extends the scope of disparate impact analysis while creating nearly impossible proof requirements. Patterson v. Mclean Credit Union reaffirms
the application of § 1981 to private employment contracts while limiting
the definition of "making a contract" to include only hiring decisions.
City of Richmond ostensibly allows race conscious plans by state and local
255. Note, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 308, 316
(1988).
256. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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governments but applies such strict review that the plans become virtually impossible to justify and tailor.
Convenient concern for stare decisis will mandate a holding when it
serves one of the agenda items (Lorance), but will not stand in the way of
destroying 18 years of pro-plaintiff precedent without so much as a reason for the change Wards Cove Packing: "but to the extent that those
cases speak of an employers' 'burden of proof' - they should have been
understood to mean an employers' production - but not persuasion burden. '2 5 7 Patterson demonstrates that some genuine fidelity to stare
decisis will impose some restraint on the Court's reshaping of civil rights
law. The reformulation of one issue into another issue will guarantee
the desired result Martin: the lower courts holding that decisions based
on a court order do not constitute intentional discrimination rearticulated as a question of whether third parties may be required to intervene
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The legitimate concern that employers will be forced to use quotas
will be used to justify the continued shutting down of systemic remedies.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, Wards Cove Packing, City of Richmond.
Strained or technical constructions of statutory language will seem to
force the desired holding. Patterson, Lorance, Betts, Martin. Circumstantial evidence will continue to be discounted in cases requiring substantial statistical proof, with no admission that this is a deviation from
normal rules of evidence, nor any justification for the different standard.
Wards Cove and City of Richmond.
The real effects of the Court's holdings will be washed away by simple denial. Examples of these effects may be found in Zipes: the prospect of uncompensated fees of $200,000 or more will not discourage
private plaintiffs form bringing Title VII claims; Wards Cove Packing and
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Price Waterhouse: broad discovery rules and
the EEOC's record-keeping requirements will provide plaintiffs with all
the necessary information to comply with difficult proof requirements.
Holdings will be justified by the familiar and convenient use of the old
saw that Congress either did or didn't ratify by silence or by some other
enactment-or by its converse, that Congress revisits Title VII often and
can always act if it does not agree.
The new Court's two ideological principles, that is the favoring of
the interests of employers and historically advantaged employees over
those of women and minorities, and the restriction of Title VII's force to
individual claims with individual remedies effectively signals the demise
of a strong national policy of aggressively working toward equal employment opportunity. In order to evaluate this action and determine the
appropriate congressional response, it is necessary to explore the theoretical underpinning of Title VII and of the Court's present ideological
principles.
It is not possible to isolate a single controlling theory which moti257. 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
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vated and guided America's struggle for racial equality over the past
twenty-five.years. A variety of ideas and forces were at work. In part,
lawmakers and judges accepted a view of humanity which rejected racism and assumed the existence of morally prescribed minimum standards of dignity and well-being. In response, they wished to eradicate
the socio-economic vestiges of slavery and racial segregation. Policy was
also guided by free market rationalism which sought to open economic
decision-making to rational principles rather than allowing such decision-making to be blocked by logically irrelevant barriers such as race or
sex. Moreover, Title VII and the case law which strengthened it arose in
an era which foresaw unlimited economic growth. It was assumed that
government policy could facilitate a growing pie, so that the status of the
underclass could be uplifted without serious cost to historically advantaged groups. Technology and automation were increasingly rendering obsolete an unlettered lower class, so that this group which had
once had economic utility as "common labor" or "hands" would become a burden to society.
After twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has reassessed this aggressive quest for racial and sexual equality. The first likely justification
for abandoning the quest would be that the goal has been sufficiently
achieved. That, however, is not the case.
Using the economic status of African Americans as an example, the
statistics belie any notion that the goals of Title VII have been achieved.
Indeed African Americans constituted a more disproportionate share of
the nation's unemployed in 1985 than in 1967. Their unemployment
rate in the first quarter of 1989 was 2.5 times that of whites. In 1967,
African American families' median income was 59% of median income
of white families. By 1985, that figure had dropped to 57.6%. African
Americans have made steady progress in managerial and professional
occupations, but at a rate which would achieve parity only in another
25 8
fifty-four years.
It is unlikely that the Court is operating, or that Congress will operate, under any illusion that the goals of Title VII have been achieved. It
is more likely that the Court has recognized that Title VII's goals cannot
be achieved without the support of educational and job training programs which have already been dropped from federal policy. Yet, the
inadequacy of civil rights legislation to accomplish its task does not call
for its dismantling but rather its preservation until supplementary programs can be set in place. Nor does the inadequacy of Title VII explain
the Court's action in clearing the way to attack existing decrees which
have resulted in jobs for women and minorities. The ideological premises of the conservative bloc indicate a hostility to Title VII's successes
rather than its failures to achieve racial equality.
The assault on systemic remedies and the elevation of the employer's interests (especially interests in autonomous decision-making)
258. B. Tidwell,

STALLING OuT: THE RELATIVE PROGRESS OF AFRICAN AMERICANS

(Washington: The National Urban League Research Department, 1989).
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may be understood in terms of the United State's declining economic
power in increasingly competitive world markets. The underlying premise of the conservative bloc may be that American business needs to be
freed from the burdens of Title VII if it is to compete effectively and
thereby benefit American society as a whole. In the narrow context of
minority set-asides and some affirmative action decrees, advancing the
interests of minorities and women has occurred at the expense of legitimate business interests such as efficiency and productivity, in that the
most qualified applicant has not always been hired and the low bidder
has not always been awarded the contract. Yet the Court's express concern goes beyond these cases in which such interests are overtly
subordinated to the goals of racial and sexual equality. The Court is
concerned that employers will use numerical quotas as a safeguard
against civil rights liability, thus adjusting their management policies on
the basis of social policy factors which will not contribute to efficiency,
2 59
productivity, and general competitiveness.
The Court is operating here in two modes - the mode of economic
policy-making and the mode of distributive justice. From the standpoint
of economic policy, the Court's premise is dubious. There is a total
dearth of evidence that businesses operating under affirmative action
decrees have been unable to compete effectively with businesses not
subject to such decrees. The existence of surreptitious quota systems is
speculative and unproven. It is doubtful that employers will be so willing to relinquish their managerial autonomy when genuinely neutral
subjective decision-making remains lawful. The real effect of a viable
disparate impact model is to raise a red flag before the employer's eyes,
when its practices have a substantial disparate impact on a protected
group, so that prudence will require that employer to insure that its
practices are genuinely neutral and reasonably necessary to its business
enterprise.
Nor can it be argued persuasively that productivity is impaired by
the cost of internally monitoring compliance. The small employer can
insure compliance without extensive personnel analysis. The large employer must have in place a personnel department which will insure fair
and reasonable employment practices for the benefit of morale and productivity even absent Title VII. Any added management costs attributable to disparate impact analysis of affirmative action decrees would be de
minimis.
In summary, there is not a compelling factual case, from the standpoint of economic policy, for the Court's departure from the twenty-five
year old policy of advancing racial and sexual equality. Instead, the
Court is operating from a Spencerian economic utilitarianism which
trusts a free market (i.e., a market in which management is free of noncontractual obligations to labor and society) to produce the greatest
good for the greatest number, albeit at the expense of those who enter
259. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
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the competition with a disadvantage. Interestingly, few if any of the
emerging competitors in the world markets operate on the basis of this
nineteenth century philosophy. While it is not unprecedented for the
Supreme Court to arrogate unto itself the province of economic policy, 260 that role has been left to other branches of government for the
past fifty years. 2 6 1 Deference to the modern federal system, and the superior capacity of Congress and the executive branch to fully assess such
complex questions would dictate that such decisions should be eschewed by the Court.
Regarding the distributive justice mode, the Court is at least attempting to perform its proper function. Moreover, even if the economic policy considerations mitigated against preservation of a viable
Title VII, it might be hoped that our society would not sacrifice distributive justice to productivity. Yet, what is just in this context? In Zipes, the
conservative bloc "welcomed" non-minority interveners to protect "the
'2 62
legitimate expectations of employees innocent of any wrongdoing.
The Court seems painfully aware that the socio-economic advancement
of minorities and women can be accomplished only at the expense of
non-minorities and men who have not personally oppressed anyone.
The Court is consistently concerned to insure that members of historically advantaged groups not be deprived of the fruits of their qualifications and merit in order to advance the goals of racial equality.
The Court's new conception of Title VII is akin to the concept of a
statutory tort action with limited remedies. The Court conceives of individuals with statutory rights to be free from discrimination, and entitled
to injunctive relief against wrongdoers who intentionally violate those
personal rights. This framework is suggested throughout the 1989 decisions. For example, in City of Richmond, the Court disallows remedies for
societal discrimination, limits remedies to industrial discrimination, and
refrains from limiting remedies to the City's own discrimination only because strict scrutiny had killed the remedies anyway. 2 6 3 Civil rights remedies, in the mind of this Court, may operate only against tortfeasors.
Such a conceptual framework, however, is grossly inadequate to
comprehend the distributive justice issues which are at the heart of civil
rights litigation. We have inherited a defacto caste system which itself is
a remnant of slavery, segregation, and dejure denial of women's status as
adult citizens. This system is perpetuated sometimes by racial and sexual stereotyping (Price Waterhouse), sometimes by actual conspiracies to
foreclose opportunities to disadvantaged groups in order to hoard them
for the advantaged group (Lorance), sometimes by customs and practices
which skew applicant flow (Wards Cove), sometimes by legacies of racism
and sexism which discourage women and minorities from even compet260.
of New
261.
262.
263.

J. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 343-44 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing Lockner v. State
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
Id. at 114.
109 S. Ct. 2732, 2736 (1989).
See supra note 39.
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ing for economic opportunities historically reserved for whites and/or
males (City of Richmond), sometimes foreclosed by social networks, and
sometimes by the racism and sexism which have impaired the educational, social, and professional formation of disadvantaged groups so as
to handicap them in free market competition.
The result of this inheritance is a distribution of wealth and opportunity disproportionate either to individual need or individual merit. It
is disproportionate to need in that human needs are relatively equal; and
to the extent that needs are unequal, the needs of the disadvantaged
groups are greater as a result of past deprivation; yet, the greater wealth
and opportunity goes to the advantaged groups. It is disproportionate
to merit in that the distribution is irrationally skewed by discrimination
whether at the personal, industrial, or societal level. Advantages born of
such discrimination do not correspond to merit in any ethical sense.
Thus members of the advantaged groups, even though they may be personally innocent of wrongdoing are unjustly enriched. Correspondingly, disadvantaged groups are unjustly impoverished; and the larger
society, including all groups, is impoverished by the suppression of potential contributions by members of disadvantaged groups on arbitrary
and anachronistic grounds.
The Court's concept of civil rights actions as statutory tort claims
does not comprehend the equitable nature of Title VII remedies, the
ethical grounding of the statutory scheme in the concept of unjust enrichment, or the systemic and societal goals of civil rights legislation. If
civil rights claims were tortious in nature, they would entail jury trials,
actual and punitive damage awards, a much longer statute of limitations,
and no mandatory administrative procedure before filing. Instead, the
statutory scheme is framed so as to favor negotiated and equitable resolutions, with limited monetary liability exposure for employers, but including aggressive prospective remedies.
The present Court operates from a highly atomistic, individualistic
view of society. Hence, it can support the claims of a plaintiff such as
Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse but is strongly disinclined to permit the
problems of racism and sexism to be addressed systemically by either
legislation or lower courts. Discrimination issues are restricted to oneon-one showdowns, deciding who is right and who is wrong. Such a
distortion of civil rights legislation leaves only a hollow echo of the ideals which formed this social policy for these past twenty-five years. The
result will almost certainly be a closing of many doors now open to women and minorities, a fortifying of the defacto socio-economic caste system, and growing disparity of wealth between the haves and the havenots. Moreover, this cannot be a mere return to bygone years, as the
technological obsolescence of the unlettered lower class has rendered
the status of the poor far more desperate.
IV.

THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

In light of the current makeup of the Court and the majority's ap-
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proach to vital Title VII issues, the only recourse for preservation of
much of Title VII's vitality will be a congressional response. 264 Much
legislative work will already be required simply to address the major results of the 1989 term. The following is a list of legislative actions necessary to respond to the 1989 cases.
1. Congress must review the economic status of minorities and women and find that the effects of hundreds of years of discrimination have
not yet been eradicated. Congress must reaffirm the strength and importance of the national commitment to eradicating the effects of discrimination and to opening channels to economic progress for all
American citizens.
2. Congress should clarify the scope of § 1981 to establish that its
prohibitions against racial discrimination apply to all phases of making,
performing and enforcing private contracts but excluding from coverage
those employment relationships subject to Title VII.
3. The 180/300 day filing requirement should be amended to clarify
that, in the case of intentionally discriminatory seniority systems, such
time period should commence to run upon notice to the employee of
actual adverse action based upon the seniority system. "Adverse action"
would be defined as action negatively affecting wages, benefits, terms, or
conditions of employment other than seniority status as such.
4. Congress should clarify that employment actions taken in the
good faith belief that they were required by an existing court order do
not violate Title VII. This principle should be enacted as an affirmative
defense so that the burden of its proof will fall on the party with better
access to the evidence, the employer. However, affirmative action decrees should remain subject to the continuing equitable jurisdiction and
oversight of the Court, and be subject to periodic reviews to be held
after public notice to all interested persons.
5. Congress should require that, prior to the entry of a remedial
decree, the parties must jointly identify and notify potentially affected
groups, and the Court must hold a fairness hearing in order to consider
the positions of these groups. Congress should include a fee provision
requiring the defendant to pay the prevailing plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees during the entire remedial phase unless the plaintiffs' actions are found to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. If
some portion of plaintiff's fees were incurred in response to frivolous or
unreasonable actions on the part of an intervenor, the intervenor would
pay that portion of plaintiff's fees rather than the defendant.
6. Congress should enact a third category of Title VII violation
prohibiting the use of employment practices which have a substantially
264. The Fair Employment Reinstatement Act, introduced by Sen. Metzenbaum, is an
attempt to repair the damage done to disparate impact analysis by Wards Cove. S. 1261,
10 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 90-H.B. 7 (1989). Sen. Simon has introduced a bill
which relies on § five of the fourteenth amendment and Fullilove, S. 1235, 10 1st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG REc. 82-H.B. 5 (1989) to empower state and local governments to enact
minority set-asides despite City of Richmond.
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disparate adverse impact upon protected groups when reasonable alternatives exist. Such alternatives should be reasonably effective to serve
the employer's needs, but need not be equally effective. The alternative
practices and the employer's business needs should be required to be
disclosed at the administrative stage of the proceedings. The new section should provide an affirmative defense for practices that have a substantial business justification. An employer's failure to comply with the
record-keeping requirements of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures should create a rebuttable presumption that challenged practices have a substantial disparate impact. Such record-keeping requirements would require elaboration and clarification
commensurate with their new significance in light of this amendment.
7. Congress should enact a definition of "employment practices"
which requires no more specificity in identifying the challenged employment practices than the employer has used in complying with the
EEOC's record-keeping requirements for employers, unless more precise identification is possible by recourse to other reasonably available
sources of proof.
The fourteenth amendment holding in City of Richmond is by far the
most difficult to repair. The holding is a majority only because a three
Justice plurality was willing to tiptoe around Fullilove based upon the
"unique" enforcement power granted to Congress by § 5 of the amendment, and the § 1 constraint upon the power of states. 2 65 In that portion ofJustice O'Connor's opinion, she supported this key distinction, in
part, by quoting Professor Bohrer: "Congress may authorize, pursuant
to § 5, state action that would be foreclosed to the states acting
26 6
alone."
It is unclear how far the plurality would be willing to take this distinction. It is possible that a carefully drafted, supported, and tailored
congressional "authorization" could pass muster with one or more of
the plurality, withJustice Stevens, and with the three dissenting Justices.
However, even if there is a realistic possibility that a majority would
allow what would, in effect, be a congressional delegation of § five enforcement power, the risk may be too great. Constitutional construction
is the one arena in which the Court is virtually uncheckable, and the risk
of another more serious ruling limiting congressional power 26 7 may well
outweigh the damage of the City of Richmond defeat.
265. City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706, 719 (1989).
266. Id. at 720, Justice O'Connor quoting: Bohrer, Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove: Benign
Discrimination and CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 IND. L.J. 473,
512-13 (1981).
267. See Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in which he writes, "[tihe process by
which a law that is an equal protection violation when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me; but as it is not before us, any reconsideration of that issue must await some
further case." City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706, 734 (1989).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The effects of two hundred years of slavery and another hundred
years of overpowering economic discrimination cannot be eradicated by
twenty-five years of Title VII and limited voluntary affirmative action
plans. Most of the heavy burdens of three hundred years of injustice are
still with us. It is clear. that someone is going to have to carry these burdens. It is also clear that even quotas and affirmative action programs
would only shift a small portion of these heavy burdens to America's
advantaged classes - to those who, innocent though they may be, have
inherited the benefits of an economic system built upon the backs of
their fellow citizens - to those who are more able to carry their share of
an added burden. Racism and sexism are deeply ingrained in American
culture. Even the cases, selected by the Court as opportunities to reject
pro-plaintiff doctrines this past term, attest to this fact, as the evidence
portrays "Filipino bunkhouses", women referred to charm schools to
further accounting careers, and cities with black majorities awarding all
but 0.67% of their contracts to white owned businesses. It is the persistent irony of American culture that its democratic ideals continue to be
undermined in this way. Yet the democratic values implicit in our governmental system are understood not as absolute accomplishments, but
as goals which we are always in the process of attaining. The 1988 term
of the Supreme Court is an unfortunate step backward from such attainment. It can be remedied only by prompt and vigorous congressional
action.

